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THE AMERICAN CORPORATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: FUTURE FORMS OF STRUCTURE AND
GOVERNANCE
Azizah Y. al-Hibri*
The fact is that America, having left the industrial phase, is
today entering a distinct historical era: and one different
from that of Western Europe and Japan .... What makes
America unique in our time is that it is the first society to
experience the future .... For better or for worse, the rest of
the world learns what is in store for it by observing what
happens in the U.SA ... Today, America is the creative
society; the others, consciously or unconsciously, are emula-
tive.'
Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1968
The last few decades have ushered in many changes and
challenges to the American corporation. Foremost among these
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1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, America in the Technetronic Age: New Questions of Our
Time, in TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAiRs 274, 278 (Larry Hickman & Azizah al-
Hibri eds., 1981).
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is the Technetronic or Information Revolution, which paradoxi-
cally not only shrank the world (the macrocosm) into a "global
village,"' but at the same time expanded the individual human
experience (the microcosm) exponentially. This dual action has
created the new Global Economic Order, as well as the sphere
of customized industrial production.
Despite early attempts by many scholars to prepare the coun-
try, the Information Revolution has had a drastic impact on the
American corporation. Many corporate governance structures
have been modified as a result of this revolution; most notably,
those in Silicon Valley.' Investments were made and skilled
labor prepared in the best universities on earth, here in the
United States. Nevertheless, the claim made by Dr. Brzezinski
in 1968 has clearly lost some of its vigor today. In the last two
decades, the United States has seen its undisputed competitive
technological advantage over Europe and Japan shrink.4 Even-
tually, the United States resorted to international joint ven-
tures in part to import some of the technologies developed
abroad.5
This disconcerting state of affairs has raised many questions,
such as: why did our undisputed technological advantage shrink
in the last two decades? Also, what will it take for the United
States to regain its prior position? Is it possible for a technolog-
ically less advanced country to leapfrog ahead of the United
States in informatics technology? As I will show in the third
2. This term was first introduced into the literature by Marshall McLuhan in
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 63 (1967). It was also discussed in a later book co-
authored by McLuhan and Bruce R. Powers entitled THE GLOBAL VILLAGE (1989).
3. One of the best works on Silicon Valley which discusses this aspect is
ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE (1994). See also EVERETr M. ROGERS &
JUDITH K. LARSEN, SILICON VALLEY FEVER: GROWTH OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CULTURE
(1984).
4. See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE 50 (1992); Mike
Hobday, Innovation in Semiconductor Technology: The Limits of the Silicon Valley
Network Model, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 157 (Mark Dodgson et
al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG,
THE U.S. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 3 (Consortium on Competitiveness and Coop-
eration Working Paper No. 90-3) (arguing that "Itjhe U.S. innovation system has not
succeeded . . . in maintaining pre-1973 rates of growth in real earnings; nor has it
enabled U.S. productivity growth to match that of other industrial economies; nor has
it prevented a significant deterioration in the U.S. current account").
5. See generally MoWERY & ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 3-4.
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part of this article, there are historical precedents for technolog-
ical leapfrogging. There are also good explanations for such
occurrences. The consequences of falling behind, however, can
be disastrous.
This article focuses on corporate governance issues as they
relate to the new technological developments and the issue of
leapfrogging. I examine various theories about the new tech-
nologies and the changes in corporate governance that they
may necessitate. I then assess and critique these theories in
light of historical and other data. I suggest that our very con-
cept of the corporation will be transformed by the Information
Age. I also offer my own view as to the optimal forms of corpo-
rate governance that can equip American corporations with
sufficient tools to win the accelerating competition anticipated
for the next century. In presenting this solution, I also recog-
nize the important role of human capital in the Information
Age, and argue that this role will ultimately change the concep-
tual framework underlying our present system of corporate
governance.
Section I provides a description of the Silicon Valley experi-
ence and its distinctive organizational features. Two of these,
open communication and an aversion to hierarchies, are central.
Section II introduces some widely-recognized theories about the
distinctive features of the Information Age. These features are
then compared with the Silicon Valley features described in
Section I. Section III investigates the preparatory and early
stages of the First Industrial Revolution (henceforth, the "In-
dustrial Revolution") for features similar to those found in Sili-
con Valley. The results lead to the conclusion that these dis-
tinctive features are in fact indicative of an innovative commu-
nity as opposed to a specifically technetronic one. Section IV
bolsters this conclusion by reviewing some well-known litera-
ture on innovation and management. Section V examines more
closely the notion of hierarchy and distinguishes different types
of hierarchies. The ones that create a less hospitable climate for
innovation turn out to be those that exhibit a high level of
control. Section VI discusses forms of corporate governance that
would reduce "surplus repression7 and create a cooperative
communicative milieu in a firm. It also discusses the effect of
the increased importance of human capital contributions to
1997] 1401
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firms of the Information Age. It argues that the abundance of
financial capital together with the shortage in skilled human
capital, will ultimately result in a conceptual shift that would
readjust the preferred Industrial Age status of financial capital
in the corporate governance of the firm and extend a similar
status to human capital. The Conclusion summarizes the re-
sults of this article.
I. THE SILICON VALLEY EXPERIENCE
The Silicon Valley experience is an important one for the
purposes of this article. It involves advanced information tech-
nology and introduces a novel set of features which has impact-
ed the corporate governance structures of firms in the Valley.
Furthermore, the Silicon Valley experience has been successful.
Some authors have argued that it is precisely these distinctive
corporate features which have earned the Valley its enormous
success as a leader of the Information Revolution.' If the claim
is correct, then the experience is a valuable harbinger of corpo-
rate changes that will sweep the world as the Information Rev-
olution spreads.
Situated in Northern California, Silicon Valley is a relatively
recent comer to information technology. It has, nevertheless,
been able to outstrip more established regions in the country
that manufacture similar products. Its historical nucleus is a
garage in Palo Alto in which two Stanford engineering students,
William Hewlett and David Packard, started an electronic in-
strumentation business in the late Thirties.' The Hewlett-
6. See DAVID PACKARD, THE HP WAY 153-54 (1995) (quoting Drucker who is re-
ferred to as the "godfather of modem management," who points out that "in the tra-
ditional organization ... the skeleton, or internal structure, was a combination of
rank and power. In the emerging organization, it has to be mutual understanding
and responsibility"); ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 146 (referring to the Valley's
"distinctive style of management"); ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, CREATING A
NEW CIVILIZATION 20 (1994); T. George Harris, The Post-Capitalist Executive: An In-
terview with Peter F. Drucker, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1993, at 122; see also
MICHAEL S. MALONE, THE BIG SCORE 35 (1985) (describing the Hewlett-Packard man-
agement style as "a new type of corporate culture, an institutional morality never
seen before in a big firm"); Ira Sager, Cloning the Best of the Valley, Bus. WIL, Aug.
18-25, 1997, at 138-144 (stating that the secret to Silicon Valley's success lies not in
silicon but in "the way of doing business"; also, quoting a venture capitalist who
characterized the Valley "as a network, as opposed to a hierarchy").
7. See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 35-46; see also ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note
1402
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Packard Company (HP), resulting from efforts encouraged by
Stanford Professor Frederick Terman, presaged professional
relationships in the Valley.8
Researchers have identified these relationships, advocated by
Professor Terman and articulated further by HP, as the critical
ingredients in the early success of Silicon Valley.' These rela-
tionships and associated corporate structures will be described
and then examined to determine their potential role in the
success of informatics companies in the United States.
Together, Hewlett and Packard introduced the "HP way" to
their company." The HP way rejects authoritarian hierarchies
and operates on the basis of trusting and motivating em-
ployees." The cornerstone of this way is helpfulness and coop-
eration.'2 It starts by recruiting the most capable individuals
available for a task and motivating them to do the best job
they can. As a sign of trust, HP provides its employees with
flexible hours and leaves storerooms unlocked and part bins
open. This way, a product designer can come to the office after
hours and take home a part needed for an experiment he" is
3, at 30-32 (recognizing the pioneering roles of Hewlett and Packard, but arguing
that the birth of electronics in the Valley took place in 1912, in Palo Alto, when Lee
de Forest conducted a vacuum tube experiment); SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 20.
8. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 20; see also ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3,
at 31-34. It is worth noting that the contributions of Professor Terman were not
limited to his positive influence on his two graduate students. Actually, he was the
person who single-handedly promoted the industrial park concept at Stanford Univer-
sity in the Forties. The industrial park, which involved leasing university land to
select companies, worked extremely well, benefitting both Stanford and these com-
panies. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 23.
9. See, e.g., PACKARD, supra note 6, at 126-28 (describing the importance of trust
in people, participatory management, teamwork and a strong spirit of cooperation);
ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 80 (illustrating how close networking proved to
be advantageous for the region, and citing a Federal Trade Commission report which
states that "the unique strength of the semi-conductor industry derives from its firms'
rapid copying of each other's innovative chips"); SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 31-32, 46
(describing the semiconductor community in Palo Alto as a tightly knit group with
quasi-familial loyalty and an unusual spirit of cooperation and stating that "competi-
tion required continuous innovation, which in turn required cooperation among
firms").
10. See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 128.
11. See id. at 152-55; see also SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 51.
12. See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 128.
13. Throughout this paper, in describing past or existing conditions in Silicon
Valley and elsewhere, the masculine gender has been used to emphasize gender in-
equalities in the field. For more on this point, see ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3,
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conducting there.14 HP also concerns itself with the welfare of
its employees and adopts policies to promote that welfare. 5
HP provides its employees with flexibility in working towards
common goals" and encourages closer relations among them in
order to facilitate a form of participatory management. 7 By
consulting its employees, HP makes each one of them feel that
he is a member of a team. Furthermore, in order to retain its
emphasis on individual responsibility and achievement, HP has
decentralized its corporate structure as it has grown larger. 8
It has broken it into divisions that have retained the kind of
intimacy and ease of communication that characterized the
company when it was smaller. At the same time, these divi-
sions have achieved another primary goal, namely that of pro-
viding employees with considerable autonomy, thus "creating an
environment [which] foster[s] individual motivation, initiative
and creativity."9
When HP's growth, nevertheless, forced it to develop a bu-
reaucracy, Hewlett and Packard recognized the emerging threat
to intra-firm communication and decisional agility. They imme-
diately restructured the company so as to eliminate unneces-
sary layers of management." In their efforts to "flatten" the
organizational structure of authority, however, they did not
reject all hierarchies. Instead, a policy of management by objec-
tive (MBO) was introduced, which Packard defined as the an-
tithesis of management by control (MBC).
He said:
[MBC] refers to a tightly controlled system of management
of the military type, where people are assigned-and expect-
at 141-45. See also Steve Hamm, Why Women Are So Invisible, Bus. WK., Aug. 18-25,
1997, at 136. In discussing future developments, gender-neutral terms were used in
the belief that these inequities will be remedied.
14. See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 136-37. Packard observes, however, that while
this policy continues and lab stock (a relatively small supply of HP's best parts and
equipment) remains generally open, production stock is restricted. See id. at 137.
15. See id, at 130.
16. See id. at 141, 152-53.
17. See id. at 127-28.
18. See id. at 139-41; see also SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 50-51.
19. PACKARD, supra note 6, at 141.
20. See id. at 150.
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ed to do-specific jobs, precisely as they are told and with-
out the need to know much about the overall objectives of
the organization. [MBO], on the other hand, refers to a
system in which overall objectives are clearly stated and
agreed upon, and which gives people the flexibility to work
towards these goals in ways they determine best for their
own areas of responsibility.2
These are the basic contours of the HP way. Whereas not all
of its features have been duplicated en masse in other Silicon
Valley organizations, the Valley as a whole reflects some of the
basic assumptions underlying these features: trust, cooperation,
egalitarianism and close professional ties. It also reflects a
distinctive, non-autarkic, consultative management style based
on these featuresY
Although there are some leading firms in the Valley which
are highly structured, such as Intel, most firms exhibit a dis-
tinctly egalitarian, decentralized managerial structureY One
purpose of this structure is to retain the firm's entrepreneurial
spirit by delegating a great deal of responsibility to manag-
ers.' Another purpose is to nurture the spirit of cooperation
existing in the Valley. This spirit of cooperation has so infected
the Valley that it has reached across company lines and largely
replaced competitive behavior with a strong sense of communi-
ty." It is not unusual for engineers to call their friends at
competitive firms to discuss a problem that the others may
have encountered and solved earlier. In fact, they tend to fre-
quent the same bars and restaurants after hours where they
discuss technical matters.28 This openness in information ex-
change, unprecedented in the United States, is rooted in shared
21. Id. at 152.
22. See id. at 126-28 (dedicating a chapter to a description of how these concepts
helped build HP); SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 51-52.
23. See ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3 at 99, 145-46; see also SAXENIAN, supra
note 3, at 53 (describing how Intel's organizational structure, though less familial,
was also designed "to facilitate the exchange of ideas and information," encouraging
"lopenness and confrontation").
24. See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 80; ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3 at 145-46.
25. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 31-37; see also MALONE, supra note 6, at 8;
ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 226-27 (noting that Silicon Valley is most acutely
collaborative when faced with an external threat, like that posed by Japan in the
1980s).
26. See ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 84; SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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past professional experiences and a scholarly/scientific attitude
which dedicates individual technological achievements to the
cause of advancing technology as a whole." As a result, the
industrial system of the Valley is effectively organized around
professional and technical networks rather than individual
firms." So fundamental is the attitude of openness to the fab-
ric of relations in the Valley that companies which attempted to
restrict the exchange of information through legal action earned
a poor reputation among potential employees in the Valley and
suffered internal morale problems." As a result, information
exchange continues, even among employees from highly compet-
itive companies, although some information is usually held
back, if highly sensitive.0 This state of affairs has added a
new term to the American dictionary--co-opetition.3 1
Because of the commitment of engineers to the technology
itself, many tend to view themselves as employees not of one
company or another but of the Valley as a whole. 2 This, along
with other factors such as the inelasticity of the supply of
skilled labor, has contributed to the high mobility rate that has
become the norm among Valley employees." As one engineer
put it, "[o]ut here it was not that big a catastrophe to quit your
job on Friday and have another job on Monday and this was
just as true of company executives. You didn't necessarily have
to tell your wife. You just drove off in another direction on
Monday morning." 4 This mobility has helped to speed up the
27. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 36. Other factors, however, may be at play.
Note, for example, the story recounted by Rogers and Larsen, supra note 3, at 80,
where one engineer smuggled out from Intel a couple of prototypes of a new chip
needed by another company to develop a new product. According to the authors, Intel
was "very happy" because there were, as a result, some immediate buyers.
28. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 30.
29. See Alan Hyde, How Silicon Valley Has Eliminated Trade Secrets (and Why
This Is Efficient) 19 (Feb. 7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Univer-
sity of Richmond Law Review).
30. See ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 81; see also supra note 27 and ac-
companying text.
31. A whole book has now been published about this term. See ADAM M.
BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION (1996).
32. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 37 (quoting Wilf Corrigan, founder of LSI
Logic, in John Markoff, Silicon Valley Faces a Midlife Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
1992, at D1).
33. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 35.
34. Id. at 34; see ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 87-88. See generally
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cross-fertilization of ideas among regional firms and has result-
ed in a state of continuous innovation.35
It is worth noting, however, that despite its novel set of fea-
tures which has helped accelerate its growth, the Valley has a
darker side which threatens its continued success. This side
includes outdated attitudes towards race and gender and the
emergence of pressing environmental and other problems."
There is reason to believe that, with the success of some immi-
grants and women in the Valley, attitudes will change in time.
If they do not change fast enough, other regions willing to em-
brace talent, regardless of its color and gender, may take the
lead.
Some authors have argued that it is the very nature of the
information industry which makes the extensive form of infor-
mation exchange practiced in Silicon Valley desirable.37 This
thesis is bolstered by the comparative information gathered
about another technological region, Route 128 in Massachusetts.
That region was the front runner in technological innovation
and production just a few decades ago."s It has a long history
of technological innovation with unparalleled concentration in
skilled labor, capital and technology." Nevertheless, as the
MALONE, supra note 6, at 262.
35. See ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 273-74. It is important to note, how-
ever, that this openness has not totally destroyed such traditional behavior as indus-
trial espionage, nor has it eliminated all need for security measures in many firms.
Rather, it has brought about a major perceptual and behavioral shift that minimizes
the central role usually accorded to enhancing secrecy and protecting trade secrets
through security measures and strict hierarchical chains of command. See id. at 94-
95; see also MALONE, supra note 6, at 233 (stating that Fairchild did not sue any of
the spin-off firms in the 1960s, even though the employees leaving the company
"raided [it] with absolute abandon").
36. For more on this, see supra note 13. See also ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note
3, at 197-99. But attitudes may be changing slowly, for example, see Hamm, supra
note 13, at 123 (noting that new immigrants are succeeding in the Valley).
37. See Hyde, supra note 29, at 7 (noting that Silicon Valley would not have
enjoyed the growth it did if the California courts enforced a strict interpretation of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426 (West 1998)); see also ROGERS
& LARSEN, supra note 3, at 81; SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 5.
38. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 59; see also ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3,
at 237 (describing the shift to high growth industries in 1955 and its success based
on government contracts). According to Saxenian, Route 128, which had its genesis in
an MIT project established in 1918, lost its competitive edge in the eighties and
never recovered. See generally SAXENIAN, supra note 3.
39. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 59; see also ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3,
14071997]
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competition in information technology heated up, Silicon Valley
became the undisputed leader by the end of the Sixties.'
What is remarkable about Route 128 is its starkly traditional
style of organization and management. This style emphasizes
hierarchies combined with an authoritarian ethic.41 Generally,
local companies built self-contained and vertically integrated
structures.42 They created organizations characterized by bu-
reaucracies, formal decision making, loyal long-term employees,
and conservative workplace procedures.' These organizations
were isolated from each other, sometimes even physically.'
Furthermore, MIT and Harvard did not develop close relation-
ships with the region. It appears that the prevalent culture in
the East was one of self-reliance.4" It was influenced by an
earlier industrial era, that of the Industrial Revolution.'
The question arises as to whether these "cultural" differences
between the Valley and Route 128 underlie their disparate
performance. In the next section, I introduce discussions by
futurists who have described the special features of the new
Information Age and have argued for sometime now that it will
at 236.
40. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 78.
41. See id. at 60. The management style was influenced by American Research
and Development Corporation, the first modem venture capital firm. From its cre-
ation in 1946 until 1972, the firm was led by Georges F. Doriot, a French-born
brigadier general and a professor at the Harvard Business School. See SUSAN
ROSEGRANT & DAVID R. LAMPE, ROUTE 128: LESSONS FROM BOSTON'S HIGH-TEcH
COMMUNITY 111 (1992). Acting as a mentor to Ken Olsen, founder of Digital Equip-
ment Corporation (DEC), Doriot influenced certain business practices. These included
the practice of keeping equity out of the hands of the employees, which Olsen fol-
lowed "assiduously." See Richard Rapaport, Culture War: Route 128, FORBES ASAP,
Sept. 13, 1993, at 54.
42. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 69. Saxenian describes DEC as an example of
the Route 128 style. DEC, a multinational corporation, is headquartered in the second
smallest town in Massachusetts. The only access routes to it are three two lane coun-
try roads and a company helicopter. The company was a "world unto itself." See id
at 71.
43. See id. at 73-74.
44. See id. at 71.
45. According to Saxenian, the founder of DEC also attributes the social conserva-
tism of the Route 128 region and the reluctance of its employees to exchange infor-
mation or rely on outsiders to the influence of its Puritanical tradition of self-reliance.
See id. at 62.
46. See id. at 69-70 (arguing that the managerial notions of companies in the
Route 128 region were shaped by managers from traditional industrial companies
such as General Electric, Sylvania and RCA).
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engender a new form of organization in society quite different
from that imposed by the Industrial Revolution and very simi-
lar to that exhibited by Silicon Valley firms. These claims are
then evaluated in the following section in light of historical
evidence from the Industrial Revolution. The evidence points to
the conclusion, discussed in the rest of the article, that the
features identified with Silicon Valley have a long history that
shows their great significance to firm organization.
II. C L TION AND THE INFORMATION AGE
Alvin and Heidi Toffier, famous American futurists, an-
nounced in their widely-read book. Creating a New Civilization,
that "[a] new civilization is emerging in our lives, and blind
men everywhere are trying to suppress it."47 According to
them, this new civilization, which they labeled "The Third
Wave," brings with it, among other things, "changed ways of
working, loving and living, a new economy.., and... an
altered consciousness as well."" It renders assembly lines ob-
solete and radically changes corporations.49
The Third Wave is that of the new information society. It is
knowledge-based, requires globalization in various aspects of
life, including business and finance, and its economies operate
at accelerated speeds. 0 It goes beyond standardization, cen-
tralization, and concentration of resources, which are typical of
the industrial or Second Wave societies.51 It demassifies pro-
duction, media and other aspects of society, introducing instead
industrial customization, just-in-time inventories and proliferat-
47. TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 6, at 19.
48. Id-
49. See Ud at 19-20.
50. See id at 31-33.
51. See id. at 20.
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ing channels of cable television. 2 It eventually leads to a rise
in individual heterogeneity."
The Second Wave is characterized by mass production, mass
education, and specialized corporations and universities.' The
Tofflers point out that Second Wavers are still trying to cling to
power on the American scene.55 For this reason, they predict
that the next major conflict will not be between the West and
other nations, as Samuel Huntington predicted, but between
Third Wavers pursuing change and Second Wavers who will
defend their vested interests in obsolete industrial structures.56
According to the Tofflers, the vertical integration of the Sec-
ond Wave is replaced by deliberate attempts to "hollow out" the
corporation of the Third Wave." A Third Wave company tries
to contract out as many of its tasks as possible, reduce its staff
and size to a minimum and disperse its activities to various
geographical locations, thus becoming a "nexus of contracts.5 5
Under this view of the Third Wave, we can conclude that HP is
civilizationally a transitory structure which reflects some Third
Wave features but retains many Second Wave features as well.
Many Silicon Valley organizational structures, however, fit the
Toffier description perfectly and appear to have completed the
transition to the Third Wave successfully. Whether this is in-
deed the case is the topic of the next few sections.
The Toffler voices are not a lonely presence in the wilder-
ness. Long before they spoke, other well-known scholars alerted
industrialized societies to the coming world upheaval. Marshall
McLuhan was an influential voice among those scholars.
52. See id. at 31-34. Just-in-time production would not have been possible without
the present advanced modes of computation, transportation and communication. Before
the computerization of inventory information and the emergence of overnight delivery
services, firms tied up a significant part of their capital in stocking large inventories.
The extra cost of these unnecessarily large inventories, the cost of warehousing them
and the associated risks, such as those of loss, obsolescence and market fluctuation,
were all eliminated with the just-in-time method of production.
53. See id. at 31, 37-38; see also ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 185-86,
237-38 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston eds., 1969).
54. See TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 6, at 28.
55. See id. at 25.
56. See id. at 11, 27.
57. Id. at 85.
58. See id.
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McLuhan warned the industrialized societies, and the world, of
the approaching changes associated with the Age of
Informatics. 9 As early as the Sixties, he argued that the new
age will not be simply one in which sophisticated gadgets re-
place less technologically advanced ones.60 Rather, he said, the
new age will bring with it a new human being and a new soci-
ety characterized by greater connectivity and networking.6
In Understanding Media, McLuhan argued that the printed
word is being quickly replaced by the electronic medium.62 The
medium through which knowledge is transferred, he noted, is
as critical as the message itself.' For this reason, McLuhan
argued that the new electronic medium will impact both the
individual and society in distinctive ways." To emphasize this
thesis, McLuhan coined the slogan 'The Medium is the Mes-
sage."
McLuhan meant that the electronic medium brings with it a
new mode of experience which is drastically different from that
imposed upon us by the medium of print.' Print, he observed,
is a visual medium which is mechanical, sequential and lin-
eal.' Electronic media, on the other hand, are organic and
simultaneous.' Thus, an individual who is a product of print
technology (Second Waver) is likely to experience the world in a
radically different way than a person who is the product of
electronic technology. The first would experience the world in a
sequential, lineal manner; the second would experience it as
non-lineal, simultaneous and interconnected. The former mode
of experience promotes uniformity and fragmentation and leads
to centralization (putting the fragmented parts in a series),
vertical organization (arranging them in a hierarchy) and con-
59. See MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 170-78 (1996) (reprinting
McLuhan's editorial which originally appeared in the Times Literary Supplement of
London, July 19, 1963).
60. See id.
61. See id
62. See id. at 81-82.
63. See id. at 7-14, 81-88.
64. See idU at 185, 333-35.
65. See id. at 7-9.
66. See id at 333-35.
67. For a quick list of the characteristics of the print media versus those of the
electronic media, see id. at xii-xiii, 85.
68. See id. at xii-xiii.
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trol.69 The second compels integration with commitment, par-
ticipation and pervasive decentralization.70 These features cre-
ate a new emerging world economy, characterized by a complex
duality: "a spatially dispersed yet globally integrated organiza-
tion of economic activity."7
The Toffiers and McLuhan appear to have predicted accurate-
ly developments in Silicon Valley and the differences between it
and Route 128. Silicon Valley's forms of organization go beyond
the old standardized, centralized and concentrated ones. In-
stead, they customize, decentralize, "hollow out," and throw
open the doors to networking and other forms of simultaneous
and participatory communication. Route 128, on the other hand,
continues to reflect old patterns.72
Furthermore, translating the differences between the manag-
ers and employees of the two regions to the language of the
Toffiers, McLuhan and the Sixties, these differences appear to
be ones between culture and counter culture.7" The children of
the culture belong to the old world of mechanical industry, au-
thority and hierarchy. The children of the counter culture are
finally revealed to be not "flower children," as they used to be
referred to in the Sixties, but as "electronic children," i.e., chil-
dren of the Information Age.74 Their struggle with powerful
national institutions, such as the government, the military and
corporations can now be understood as an early attempt to
reject the organizational legacy of the Industrial Age which is
based on hierarchy and authority. They were demanding in-
creased information, participation and self-determination. Ulti-
mately, some of them instituted their views in a corporate con-
text. They formed daring organizational structures which reject-
69. For McLuhan's point of view on this, see id. at 11-12, 85.
70. See id. at 4, 9.
71. SASKIA S. SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY 3 (1991).
72. But note recent changes that may affect the Route 128 management style. In
1992, Ken Olsen was forced out of the DEC and replaced with Robert B. Palmer, a
man whose managerial style is similar to that found in Silicon Valley. Olsen founded
DEC, the flagship of the Boston technology community, and his replacement "signal[s]
the end of an era." Rapaport, supra note 41, at 59.
73. The term "counter culture" was popularized by Theodore Roszak in his widely
read book, THE MAKING OF A COUNTER CULTURE (1969).
74. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 8.
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ed these hierarchies and outperformed them. As the following
sections will show, the success of these non-hierarchical struc-
tures was no accident. Furthermore, they helped the United
States leap forward technologically.
I will now investigate further the thesis (the "Thesis") that
the Silicon Valley experience embodies features peculiar to
corporations and individuals of the Information Age. To do that,
I shall turn to a rich source of information, namely, history.
III. INDUSTRIAL HISTORY AND THE SILICON VALLEY FEATURES
As Mark Roe has shown in another context, history is a great
teacher of reality and destroyer of myths.'5 In this section, I
study empirical data that predate the Information Age as a tool
for determining the truth of the Thesis. To do that, I examine a
historical period very similar to the present one. It is also a
transitional period, one during which Europe was transformed
from an agricultural society into an industrial one. Significant-
ly, Britain, the country that led the Industrial Revolution, had
lagged technologically behind other European countries for quite
a while and then leapfrogged to the front."6 In fact, Europe as
a whole had lagged technologically behind other civilizations,
such as the Chinese, which appeared at one time to be on the
verge of their own Industrial Revolution but were hampered by
political instability."
In selecting our transitional period, it is important to recog-
nize the fact that transitions have accelerated with new tech-
nologies. Thus, the Agricultural Revolution took thousands of
years to become established. The Industrial Revolution, on the
other hand, took a few hundred years. The Information Revolu-
75. See generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITI-
CAL RooTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
76. See CARLO M. CIPOLLA, BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 256-273 (1976);
W.O. HENDERSON, THE INDUSTuAIZATION OF EUROPE 14-15 (1969); 5 THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIc HISTORY OF EUROPE, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 12 (E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson eds., 1977) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION].
77. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 160-62, 214, 275-76; 3 M. HODGSON, THE VEN-
TURE OF ISLAM: CONSCIENCE AND HISTORY IN WORLD CIVILIZATION 183, 197, 199
(1974); W. MCNEIL, THE RISE OF THE WEST- A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNry
710-22 (1963).
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tion has established itself in a matter of decades." Therefore,
the comparative transitional period we will focus upon below
will span the few centuries that led to the establishment of the
Industrial Revolution.
Several developments in Europe were significant to the ad-
vent of the Industrial Revolution. Most important among the
earlier ones, for our purposes, were the rise of the towns (later
cities) in Europe in the tenth and twelfth centuries and the
subsequent formation of guilds for craftsmen living in those cit-
ies. 9 In a poor, primitive and autarkic Europe, the rise of
these cities introduced a new element to the life of its inhabit-
ants that changed the course of history, namely, freedom from
traditional institutions."0 The cities were to become later cen-
ters of the Industrial Revolution. Like their more modern coun-
terparts, regional industrial clusters such as Silicon Valley, they
were viewed as "frontiers" of a new and dynamic world free
from the yoke of serfdom and full of new opportunities and
rewards for initiative, daring and industriousness.8' Carlo
Cipolla notes, in his chronicle of Europe before its industrial-
ization, that
what counted was not only the legal fact that the serf,
having escaped from the countryside, found himself free in
the towns, but that the whole social atmosphere in the
towns was open to ambition and talent, whether the town-
dweller was a member of the lesser feudal nobility, or a
merchant, or a craftsman.82
78. See TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 6, at 19.
79. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 139; see also ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra
note 76, at 462-69.
80. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 140-42. According to Cipolla, "[tihe urban
revolution of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was the prelude to, and created the
prerequisites for, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century." Id. at 145; see
also Aldo De Maddalena, Rural Europe 1500-1750, in 2 THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURIES 273-347 (C. Cipolla ed., 1977); GEORGE RUDE, EUROPE IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ARISTOCRACY AND THE BOURGEOIS CHALLENGE 58-65 (1972).
81. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 142 (stating that "[t]he town was to the peo-
ple of Europe from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries what America was to
Europeans in the nineteenth century," and that it was said in German towns that
"the air of the city makes one free"); see also ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note
76, at 428-29; cf P. Bairoch, The City and Technological Innovation, in FAVORITES OF
FORTUNE 159 (Patrice Higonnet et al. eds., 1991).
82. CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 142.
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The towns of medieval Europe were thus different from other
towns in other civilizations. They came to symbolize freedom
from the hierarchy of feudalism and its control and became an
autonomous center which evolved its own culture, horizontal
arrangements and values.' Because the town was surrounded
by an outside world hostile to its culture, the community of
town-dwellers became more cohesive and cooperative.' At the
beginning of this transitional period, the guild emerged in the
town as a network of support among equals.85 The prepara-
tions for the Industrial Revolution, however, were barely begin-
ning. It would take a few more centuries and a continent-wide
upheaval before its final debut in Britain in the late eighteenth
century.
By the sixteenth century, the very guilds which provided
urban support networks for craftsmen deteriorated into highly
regulated, hierarchical and authoritarian structures." They
controlled the terms of the competition and the number of busi-
nessmen who could compete in a specific market." They were
furthermore co-opted by a class of wealthy manufacturers and
merchants who wanted to maintain their economic domi-
nance.' As a result, guilds became instruments of control
against the very journeymen and craftsmen they were supposed
to support. Ultimately, guilds because obstacles to economic
development and adaptation.89 Many industries and craftsmen
moved to the countryside where the guilds had very little pres-
ence, and some technological know-how was also diffused into
the countryside in the process.90
83. See id at 143; see also RUDE, supra note 80, at 62-63.
84. See JEROME BLUM, THE END OF THE OLD ORDER IN RURAL EUROPE 113-14,
414-17 (1978); CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 144.
85. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 144; see also ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra
note 76, at 466; RUDE, supra note 80, at 66.
86. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 437; see also RICHARD
GRASSBY, THE BUSINESS COz%5fUNITY OF SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND, 60-65, 75
(1995).
87. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 437; see also Herman
Kellenbenz, Technology in the Age of the Scientific Revolution 1500-1700, in 2 THE
SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES, supra note 80, at 243-44.
88. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 437; Kellenbenz, supra note
87, at 237.
89. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 437; Kellenbenz, supra note
87, at 243-44.
90. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 437; Kellenbenz, supra note
141519971
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1399
Between the twelfth and fifteenth century, Italy was in the
forefront of technological progress.91 That distinction passed to
Britain and Holland in the next two centuries, a surprising
event given the fact that Britain had lagged technologically
behind the rest of Europe. 2 Many historians have studied the
reasons that helped catapult Britain into the forefront of the
World's Industrial Revolution. Clearly, Britain satisfied some
basic prerequisites, such as the availability of coal and iron ore,
an adequate labor force and a group of innovators and entrepre-
neurs.93 Other European countries, however, shared many of
these characteristics. So, what other features accelerated the
industrialization of Britain?
According to the famous historian William McNeil, "pervasive
looseness" in the texture of the British society helped give Brit-
ain its commanding lead.' This looseness was partly the re-
sult of political developments, such as the impact of war with
the French on the British government, and the parliamentary
action to limit the trend towards absolutism by the early
Stuarts.95 It was also partly the result of economic changes,
such as those in trading patterns, the money supply, and gov-
ernmental orders.96 After examining this and other evidence,
McNeil concluded that "[q]uite possibly, in a better regulated
society, a more energetic official control of individual initiative
and war profiteering would have prevented the rapid transfor-
mation of Britain's industrial plant which in fact occurred in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries."97 Further-
more, by the eighteenth century, serfdom was no longer in
87, at 244-45; see also HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 23, 25.
91. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 174; BRIAN S. PtLLAN, Introduction to A HIS-
TORY OF EARLY RENAISSANCE ITALY 12 (1973).
92. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 174. See generally ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION,
supra note 76, at 23-28, 32-35.
93. See C.M. Cipolla, Introduction to THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EU-
ROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 11 (C.M. Cipolla ed., 1973); MCNEIL, supra note
77, at 733. It is worth noting that McNeil discusses the importance of the institu-
tional and intellectual framework within which Britain's modern industrialism arose.
Among these, he lists the "Protestant ethic." Id.; see also ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION,
supra note 76, at 427.
94. See MCNEIL, supra note 77, at 733.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 734.
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existence in Britain. 8 Commerce was energetic, forceful and
open to risk-taking and innovation. 9 Entrepreneurs did not
fear governmental interference, especially if their factories were
outside municipal boundaries."0 In addition, workmen were
able to move freely throughout the country.'01 Even social
classes were becoming less rigid, allowing some mobility.0 2
Commerce and mobility among workers and social classes sig-
nificantly increased the free flow of information.
Additionally, it is significant that only Britain experienced
the disintegration of the guild system as a result of various
factors, including legislation."3 Consequently, guild restric-
tions were less severe than they were in the rest of Europe."°4
Furthermore, non-guild craftsmen were increasing in number
causing further erosion of guild power.0 5 This sharp reduction
of guild power and its restrictive traditional approach helped
fuel the Industrial Revolution in Britain.
1 6
One factor that accelerated the demise of the guild system
was the system of "putting out" which was used not only in
Britain but also in the rest of Europe.0 7 The system involved
craftsmen (the technologists) in rural areas where guild pres-
ence was traditionally weak or absent who cooperated with
merchants (the entrepreneurs)."° The latter provided to the
98. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 113; HENDERSON, supra note
76, at 23.
99. See RUDE, supra note 80, at 53.
100. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 23.
101. See id.; ERIC PAWSON, THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: BRITAIN IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 154 (1979).
102. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 25; RUDE, supra note 80, at 80, 82.
103. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 465; see also RUDE, supra
note 80, at 44.
104. See RUDE, supra note 80, at 44; see also ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note
76, at 465.
105. See RUDE, supra note 80, at 44, 53; see also ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra
note 76, at 465.
106. See J.F. Bergier, The Industrial Bourgeoisie and the Rise of the Working Class
1700-1914, in THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 93, at 438-39;
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 465; see also RUDE, supra note 80, at
198-99.
107. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 469.70; William Lazonick,
What Happened to the Theory of Economic Development, in FAVORITES OF FORTUNE,
supra note 81, at 277-78.
108. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 470.
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former raw material and sold the finished industrial product.
The former provided the finished product.109 This system dif-
fused technology throughout the countryside and provided an
important counterweight to the guild system by opening the
door to free, i.e., non-guild labor." s
Despite the attempt to use rural craftsmen for some types of
industrial work, such as spinning, the city remained the center
of industry and innovation. Most innovations in eighteenth
century England took place in cities."' Similar data are avail-
able for some other European cities that raise a question about
the ways in which the city provided an impetus for innova-
tion." An obvious answer is that, as a general rule, the city
facilitated the diffusion of technological innovation much more
than did the countryside. There are many reasons for this. For
one, the city offered proximity and frequency of contacts among
potential innovators.' Its mobile population was constantly
bringing new ideas into the city." Its centers of learning
helped further that process of intellectual curiosity and innova-
tion." ' Through training and experience, urban industrial cen-
ters provided a steady flow of information, richer than any
other available in the countryside." 6 This density of informa-
tion acted as an impetus for further industrial innovation."7
This is why the "openness" in the British society as a whole,
and in the cities in particular, was a crucial ingredient in its
ability to leapfrog the other more technologically advanced Eu-
ropean countries.
109. See id.; Lazonick, supra note 107, at 277-78.
110. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 470, 548; Lazonick, supra
note 107, at 278.
111. See Bairoch, supra note 81, at 167.
112. See id. at 165-68.
113. See id at 168-69, 172; see also HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 64; Walter
Minchinton, Patterns of Demand, in THE FONTANA- ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE,
supra note 93, at 88-89.
114. See Bairoch, supra note 81, at 166-67; see also CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at
176-77.
115. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 62-64; see also Samuel Lilley, Technological
Progress and the Industrial Revolution 1700-1914, in THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTO-
RY OF EUROPE, supra note 93, at 231.
116. See LEWIS MUMYORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 137-38 (1972).
117. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 62-64.
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To better understand this historical example of technological
leapfrogging, we must examine briefly the history of technologi-
cal development and other related occurrences in Europe during
that period.
Around the fifteenth century, a major event took place:
Guttenberg's printing of the Bible. Until then, books were so
expensive that only the wealthy could own them."' With the
invention of movable parts printing, Europe changed forever.
For the first time, it became possible to diffuse knowledge mas-
sively in the form of printed books. Historians often point to
this development as a major factor for the diffusion of knowl-
edge throughout Europe."' Scientific and engineering manu-
scripts were disseminated among and read by many innovators
who were university graduates." But a closer look at indus-
trial progress in Europe reveals that many innovations were
made by technicians using not the scientific manuscript but the
method of trial and error."2
Almost all technological advances made during the early
stages of the Industrial Revolution were the result of the efforts
of craftsmen, not scientists.' Thus, in the case of the textile
industry and the iron and steel industries, the impetus for
innovation came from inside the industries themselves and
resulted from practical training and experience.2 3 Illustrations
of these facts abound. For example, Thomas Newcomen, inven-
tor of the steam pump, was a blacksmith; Samuel Crompton,
inventor of the mule, was a spinner and a farmer; and James
Hargreaves, inventor of the spinning jenny, was a weaver.'
118. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 167. To give an idea of the cost of books prior
to the invention of the printing press, the author mentions that in Spain, around the
early ninth century, a book cost roughly as much as two cows. See id.
119. See, e.g., ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 472; see also Bairoch,
supra note 81, at 160-61; Kellenbenz, supra note 87, at 182.
120. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 472; HENDERSON, supra note
76, at 64; Kellenbenz, supra note 87, at 182-86 (pointing out that "the practical value
of these manuscripts varied considerably; it was greatest when the author knew his
subject from practical experience").
121. See Bairoch, supra note 81, at 161; HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 63.
122. See Bairoch, supra note 81, at 161.
123. See id. at 162; see also HENDEISON, supra note 76, at 48; RUDE, supra note
80, at 51.
124. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 193. A mule is a machine that combined the
essential features of both the jenny and spinning-fi-ame, significantly increasing the
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Even the steam engine was a "rule-of-thumb development" by
James Watt, a mechanic."5
Furthermore, intercontinental diffusion of knowledge was
accomplished with the help of immigrant skilled labor, entrepre-
neurs, and indigenous technologists who plagiarized new inven-
tions after learning about them through their travels.' Evi-
dence abounds of the role of various waves of immigrants and
other types of mobile labor in carrying technological knowledge
with them to various countries. Among these examples are the
French Huguenots, Flemish Protestants, the German mining
engineers and the Dutch canal-builders, all of whom contributed
their technological expertise to Britain in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries." 7 It is such historical data that have
led some historians to conclude that the inflow of good minds,
combined with society's receptiveness to new ideas, was among
the main reasons for the industrial success of countries such as
England, Holland, Sweden and Switzerland in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. 12
So significant was this mode of diffusion of knowledge that
European governments issued decrees forbidding the emigration
of skilled workers. For example, the Venetian government
flatly prohibited the migration of caulkers."' The penalty for
a violator was six years in prison or a two hundred lire
fine. '' The Grand Duke of Florence went further in 1575,
authorizing "any person to kill with impunity" any worker in
the brocade trade who left Florence.' The Venetian and
Florentine authorities were not overreacting to a bad situation.
There is ample evidence that technological transfer in Medieval
output of spinners. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 39, 43, 47, 63.
125. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 38; RUDE, supra note 80, at 50-51.
126. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 478, 486.
127. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 177; Francois Crouzet, The Huguenots and the
English Financial Revolution, in FAVORITES OF FORTUNE, supra note 81, at 224;
HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 14.
128. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 181; ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76,
at 40.
129. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 178.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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Europe was not accomplished primarily through the diffusion of
the written word, but rather by contact among technolo-
gists."
For example, in the early sixteenth century Vittorio Zonca
published a manuscript entitled Nuovo Teatro di Machine et
Edificii, containing engravings and descriptions of intricate
machines, including one for "throwing silk by water power in a
large factory."'" That book was in a British library available
to technologists as early as 16 2 0."35 It was, however, an addi-
tional hundred years before the British succeeded in building a
silk throwing mill.3" Their success followed a trip of industri-
al espionage to Italy by a technologist named John Lombe. 3"
During his stay, he "found means to see this engine so often
that he made himself master of the whole invention and of all
the different parts and motions.""
In time, the technology of the Industrial Revolution has be-
come more closely linked to science.'39 Today's information
technology is very different from the older mechanical technolo-
gy. It reflects a closer relationship between science and technol-
ogy. For these reasons, diffusion of technology through publica-
tions may be more effective today than it was in the past. It is
still true, however, that there is a significant degree of tech-
nique which cannot be imparted except through "hands-on"
training or face-to-face discussion.'40 Consequently, even in
today's Silicon Valley, companies do include non-compete pro-
visions in contracts with their employees.' The enforcement
133. See id. at 176; see also Bairoch, supra note 81, at 168-72; cf MUMFORD, supra
note 116, at 135-36.
134. CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 174.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 174; see also HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 48; Kellenbenz, supra
note 87, at 215.
137. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 174.
138. Id. at 174; cf HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 14 (attributing this particular
technology transfer to an Italian immigrant craftsman. This difference in account does
not affect the main point of the passage, namely, the importance of practical knowl-
edge in technology transfer.).
139. See Bairoch, supra note 81, at 171-74; Samuel Lilley, Technological Progress
and the Industrial Revolution 1700-1914, in THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTORY OF Eu-
ROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra note 93, at 226-36.
140. See CIPOLLA, supra note 76, at 176.
141. See Hyde, supra note 29, at 10-11.
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of such provisions, however, has been quite lax for a variety of
reasons, not least among them (as discussed in section I) is the
aversion of the skilled technicians, who are in short supply, to
restrictive behavior.'
The diffusion of technology through publication, migration,
plagiarism and putting-out systems, to mention a few avenues,
reveals the following features about the transitory stage leading
to the Industrial Revolution. First, a large and mobile supply of
skilled labor existed in Europe, concentrated particularly in
Britain. Second, there was significant diffusion of technological
know-how despite all legal and other restrictions. Third, the
technologist of the Industrial Revolution rejected traditional
hierarchies and affiliations, opting instead to cooperate with
other technologists and entrepreneurs to achieve progress.
In fact, the achievements of the Industrial Revolution were
no more than a conglomeration of mostly incremental advances
made possible by an increasingly inclusive and interdependent
nexus of technologists.' These technologists came from differ-
ent disciplines but discovered that they could build on each
other's innovations to improve or increase the efficiency of their
own machines.' By doing so, the ability to innovate in-
creased and the quantity of innovations multiplied exponen-
tially, thrusting Britain and then the rest of Europe to the
developmental forefront. 45
To list a few familiar examples, the flying shuttle, which
doubled a weaver's output, led to a shortage in yarn." This
shortage led to improvements in the spinning wheel.'47 The
cotton mills that accelerated the shift from cottage to factory
forms of organization were powered by water wheels."4 The
Albion mills, which used steam for grinding wheat, were the
142. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
143. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 62; see also Lilley, supra note 139, at 187-
254.
144. See generally HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 62.
145. See generally HODGSON, supra note 77, at 185; PAWSON, supra note 101, at
17.
146. See Lilley, supra note 139, at 192; RUDE, supra note 80, at 51.
147. See Lilley, supra note 139, at 187-254; RUDE, supra note 80, at 51.
148. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 477; Lilley supra note 139, at
190.
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first important establishment in which all the parts of the plant
and equipment were made of metal.'49 The expansion of the
iron industry was based for a long time on increasing amounts
of water power.5 0 On the other hand, Watt would not have
been able to improve his steam engine without advances in the
metallurgical arts. 5' Use of electricity for lighting, transporta-
tion and industrial power would not have been possible without
the invention of the dynamo which harnessed steam engines,
water wheels and turbines.'52 Many of today's advanced modes
of transportation, including the airplane, would not have been
possible without the invention of the internal combustion
engine. 15
Furthermore, certain inventions were themselves the result of
the efforts of a series of inventors attempting to solve the same
problem. For example, Richard Arkwright's water-frame was
anticipated by the work of Lewis Paul and John Wyatt, who
constructed a roller-spinner machine."M James Watt's steam
engine was preceded by the atmospheric engine of Thomas
Newcomen' 55 N.A. Otto's gas engine was preceded by that of
Etienne Lenoir.'56
The preceding discussion establishes the critical role played
by craftsmen/technicians in bringing about the Industrial Revo-
lution. The discussion in this section also underlines the critical
importance of openness, increased egalitarianism, motivation,
and the free flow of information for both British craftsmen and
entrepreneurs. Together, they were able to transform Britain
from a technologically lagging country into the world leader of
the Industrial Revolution.
The above data will now be used to evaluate the Thesis,
namely that the Silicon Valley experience embodies features
149. See MUMFORD, supra note 116, at 161.
150. See Lilley, supra note 139, at 189; MIORD, supra note 116, at 161.
151. See MUMFORD, supra note 116, at 160.
152. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 56; Lilley, supra note 139, at 241;
MUmFORD, supra note 116, at 161.
153. See generally HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 57.
154. See id. at 62; Lilley, supra note 139, at 192-93; RUDE, supra note 80, at 51.
155. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 62; MUMFORD, supra note 116, at 160-61;
RUDE, supra note 80, at 50.
156. See HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 62.
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peculiar to corporations and individuals of the Information Age.
Comparing the features of the Industrial Revolution in Britain
to those of the Information Revolution in Silicon Valley, we find
them remarkably similar. Taking into account historical differ-
ences between the two, we discover that both technological
revolutions required a significant breakdown of traditional
modes of operation, the dismantling of authoritarian hierar-
chies, substantial free flow of information, cooperation and
teamwork among technologists. In fact, to use Toffierian lan-
guage, the Second Wavers described above look very much at
their moment of transition like Third Wavers. Restated in
McLuhan's terminology, the urban craftsmen of eighteenth
century Britain appear to be the "electronic/flower children" of
that era. They rejected lineal, authoritarian structures and
uniform, fragmented experiences. Instead, they pursued open
structures, interconnectedness and creative experiences.
This is no doubt a surprising conclusion for those who think
of the Industrial Revolution as giving birth to societies which
are highly (linearly, hierarchically) structured, standardized and
centralized. Some of this era's greatest achievements were the
clock, the assembly line and the orchestra. 5 ' Each one of
these achievements offered one more building block in the regi-
mentation of society in the industrial world, thus leaving no
room for individual creativity or initiative. But these features
describe a mature industrial society, not a struggling one which
is teetering on the edge of innovation and creativity.
In fact, it is interesting to observe how attempts to achieve a
free and open society turned into their opposite during the
Industrial Age. The guilds became authoritarian and restric-
tive. " Patents, initially introduced to encourage inventors to
disclose their inventions, became obstacles to fast incremental
improvements as well as to fundamentally new innovations."9
157. See MUMFORD, supra note 116, at 138-39.
158. See ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 464-69; see also HODGSON,
supra note 77, at 26.
159. See MUMFORD, supra note 116, at 194. But see ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note
3, at 93 (discussing the new attitude about patents in Silicon Valley which views
them in today's information industry as mostly ineffective).
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Today, in Silicon Valley where technological change is very
rapid and engineers can "reverse engineer" an innovation, many
innovations are not patented.' 60
Underlying this whole upheaval is a tacit rejection by the
craftsman/technologist of the view that an innovation is a pri-
vate property that belongs to the inventor as a person-
al/corporate asset. Instead, the technologist views innovation as
belonging to the world at large, to humanity."' Consequently,
the technologist (including the hacker) is in constant search of
the free flow of information. Companies that recognized this
fact early in the days of the Information Revolution did ex-
tremely well in business.'62
The fact that our discussion could move so readily between
Britain and the United States, the Industrial Revolution and
the Information Revolution, shows significant commonality be-
tween the two experiences. As has been shown above, certain
distinctive features of Silicon Valley were shared by industrial
regions in medieval and eighteenth century Britain. This result
invalidates the Thesis, namely that these Silicon Valley fea-
tures are peculiar to the Information Age. Our discussion has
shown that these features are more distinctive of an innovative
environment in which the excitement and vigor of the innova-
tors break down traditional barriers.
IV. INNOVATION, COMMUNICATION AND STRUCTURE
So far, the conclusion reached above has been based exclu-
sively on data from medieval and eighteenth century Europe as
well as today's Silicon Valley. It may therefore be enlightening
to reexamine briefly this Thesis from the point of view of
160. See ROBERT X. CRINGELY, ACCIDENTAL EMPIRES 171 (1992); ROGERS & LARSEN,
supra note 3, at 94.
161. See MUMFORD, supra note 116, at 407-09; SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 27. See
generally 1 KRANSBERG & PURCELL, TECHNOLOGY IN WESTERN CIVILZATION 313
(1997); Lilley, supra note 139, at 213.
162. IBM built its success on "an 'open architecture' or non-proprietary specification
freely available to other manufacturers." Chris Kraul, CLONES: Growing Sales
Threaten IBM PC Market Share, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 20, 1986, avail-
able in 1986 WL 2896629. At the time, there was speculation that the creation of
clones would eventually put IBM out of business. See Geoff Lewis et al., The PC
Wars: IBM vs. The Clones, Bus. WiE, July 28, 1986, at 62.
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today's traditional (non-informatics) industry. To do so, I will fo-
cus on two sets of interconnected features that appeared in the
earlier discussion as critical to innovation. The first feature is
that of open communication and collaboration, the second is
that of non-authoritarian structures.
Open Communication and Collaboration. For some time now,
both features have been topics of discussion in business man-
agement literature and that of related fields. Literature ad-
dressing issues of increased production and profitability has
also addressed, at times, issues of entrepreneurial innovation.
In fact, several distinguished authors in the field have observed
that communication and collaboration are important for innova-
tion." One version of the product cycle theory emphasizes the
critical importance of intense face-to-face interactions in the
early stages of a firm's existence when the firm tends to be
small." The assumption underlying this position is that "an
important part of the innovation process involves the rapid
exploitation of unexpected (serendipitous) exchanges of
ideas."" According to another theory, the industrial district
theory, economic growth is being generated by spatially concen-
trated networks, usually small to medium in size, with exten-
sive interfirm linkages.'66 The linkages result in a "paradoxi-
cal" state of affairs in which these firms at once compete and
collaborate with each other. 6 ' Again, the underlying assump-
tion is that these linkages engender trust which leads to collab-
oration and results in growth."
163. See, e.g., RICHARD CRAWFORD, IN THE ERA OF HUMAN CAPITAL 122-24 (1991);
SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 5; see also Philip Cooke & Kevin Morgan, The Creative
Milieu: A Regional Perspective on Innovation, in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 29-31.
164. See Bennett Harrison, Industrial Districts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, in 26
REGIONAL STUDIES 469, 473 (1991) (noting the product cycle theory "posits that the
innovation process passes through conceptually distinct, if not always fully operation-
ally separable, stages, from early experimentation to diffusion and ultimately to ma-
turity"); see also SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 5.
165. Harrison, supra note 164, at 473.
166. See id. at 469; ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3, at 238 (discussing that
Route 128 would later profit from imitating Silicon Valley's organizational and mana-
gerial style in the late 1970s, though the physical distance separating the Route 128
firms made it more difficult); SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 30-36, 43-44.
167. See Harrison, supra note 164, at 478; SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 32-33.
168. See Harrison, supra note 164, at 478. Incidentally, the firms used in this
study were not all high-tech firms; some had traditional industrial or agricultural
products.
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Joint ventures and licensing agreements, which are common
in various industries, show that communication and collabora-
tion are not limited to small and medium-size firms. Further-
more, some interesting studies show that even in the absence of
formal arrangements for communication and collaboration
among firms, technical trading of proprietary know-how does
take place routinely in some industries, sometimes with the
knowledge of managers.169 The reason for such behavior is
that companies recognize that, by trading their information,
they usually obtain other valuable information in return.'
Since certain know-how cannot be acquired from books and can
be developed either by the company engineers themselves or by
talking to others who have already developed it, it becomes
cheaper to share know-how with promising groups of compa-
nies.17 ' Clearly, know-how which has high competitive value is
usually not shared. 7'
There are various avenues for the informal exchange of
know-how. One important avenue is that of professional confer-
ences where engineers with common professional interests dis-
cuss their work.' Other avenues, especially useful when the
know-how is visibly embodied in equipment, are through suppli-
ers and customers (and at times even competitors) who interact
with the company and visit its plant.'74 Consequently, diffu-
sion of knowledge is hard to prevent, but in the absence of a
formal open communications/collaboration policy, the benefits of
such trading of know-how are significantly reduced.' 5
169. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 81 (1988); SAXENIAN,
supra note 3, at 33; Hyde, supra note 29, at 14.
170. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 169, at 82.
171. See id. at 76-77.
172. See id. at 77.
173. See id. at 77; AnnaLee Saxenian, Institutions and the Growth of Silicon Val-
ley, in ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: DEBATES, DYNAMICS
AND POLICIES 544, 548 (William Lazonick & William Mass eds., 1995); see also
SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 32.
174. See SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 3, 7; VON HIPPEL, supra note 169, at 81-82.
175. See Edwin Mansfield, How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak
Out?, 34 J. INDUS. ECON. 217, 220-21 (1985). Because process development involves
less communication and interaction with other firms than new product development,
information about it tends to leak more slowly. See id. One study covering 100 Amer-
ican traditional firms found that it takes one year on average, and in some cases as
much as fifteen months, for information about a new product or process to leak to
competitors. See id. Channels for the spread of this information, according to the
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One benefit of this diffusion of information is the develop-
ment of imitative products. These products may themselves
contain innovations, however slight, that render them superior
to the original product. Another benefit is that the new prod-
ucts may be necessary or desirable components of an innovation
being designed by another company. In this instance, while the
companies may be rivals, the new invention may be comple-
mentary. In either case, slowing the diffusion of information
slows the development of concomitant innovations.
Thus, even in non-informatics fields, a free exchange of ideas
and open communication channels continue to be distinctive
features of an innovative milieu. In the past, attempts to place
limits on such a flow of information were made in an effort to
preserve temporarily the industrialist's profits. This policy, how-
ever, had a detrimental long-term effect on the future of tech-
nological progress in the country as a whole. Consequently, a
tension was embedded in the industrial society between techno-
logical progress and economic realities. This tension was re-
solved by a compromise which slowed the rate of innovation in
order to allow industrialists the opportunity to reap the benefits
of their investments, and hence, reinvest in the economy.
This compromise is now being renegotiated in the Informa-
tion Age. The material base for the renegotiation is the fact
that Industrial Revolution products tend to have a much longer
life cycle than informatics products. The latter can become
obsolete in a matter of months. Consequently, there is no need
to slow the free flow of information to the degree experienced
previously.76 This fact points out one important result, name-
ly, that while diffusion of knowledge is essential for innovation,
there is much less tension for such diffusion in the informatics
society. Given the accelerated rate of innovation and obsoles-
cence in that society, a better, less restrictive compromise can
study, include movement of personnel among firms, informal communication of net-
works among engineers and scientists working at various firms, and professional
meetings. See id. at 221. While the intelligence-gathering process varies among indus-
tries, there is little difference in the rate of diffusion of information among them. See
id.
176. For more on patents in Silicon Valley, see ROGERS & LARSEN, supra note 3,
at 93-94. See also SAXENIAN, supra note 3, at 149.
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be made between technological progress and economic realities
in the new society.
Nevertheless, the increased frequency of suits brought by
Silicon Valley firms against other, usually smaller, firms for
alleged violations of intellectual property rights may indicate
that the region is maturing in ways not totally conducive to
future innovation."' If that is the case, then we can reach the
following conclusions. First, the behavior verifies the adage that
old (industrial) habits die hard. Second, local firms that reject
this behavior as obsolete may be able to achieve, under the
right circumstances, competitive advantage. Third, if a signif-
icant number of firms persevere in this behavior, then the re-
gion (like Route 128 before it) may lose its technological lead to
a more flexible and communicative milieu.78
Non-authoritarian Structures. I will now turn to the second
feature distinctive of innovation, namely, that of non-authoritar-
ian structures. At first glance, this second feature may appear
quite independent from the first. In fact, the two are closely
related. One good way for comprehending this relation was of-
fered by Burns and Stalker several decades ago in their impor-
tant work on innovative organizations. 9 They described two
ideal forms of organization: mechanistic and organic."s The
first was hierarchical, high control and demanded obedience.
The second was low-control and encouraged flexibility, initiative
and commitment to the goals of the organization. 8'
Burns and Stalker suggested that when a high degree of
innovation is desired and the organization's environment is
changing rapidly, the organic mode of organization is the most
suitable.'82 The reason is that organic organizations permit a
177. See Harrison, supra note 164, at 478.
178. Incidentally, that milieu may be in a different country altogether.
179. See Gerard Fairtlough, Innovation and Organization, in HANDBOOK, supra note
4, at 326 (discussing the study of innovative organizations in TOM BURNS & G.M.
STALKER, THE MANAGEMENT OF INNOVATION (1966)); WALTER R. NORD & SHARON
TUCKER, IMPLEmENTING ROUTINE AND RADICAL INNOVATIONS 14-17 (1987); see also
CRAWFORD, supra note 163, at 122-23.
180. See BURNS & STALKER, supra note 179, at 5-6; Fairtlough, supra note 179, at
326.
181. See BURNS & STALKER, supra note 179, at 11, 121-22; Fairtlough, supra note
179, at 326; NORD & TUCER, supra note 179, at 14.
182. See BURNS & STALKER, supra note 179, at 121-22; Fairtlough, supra note 179,
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higher degree of adaptability, uninhibited expressions of opinion
and a freer flow of ideas."8 Numerous studies following in the
footsteps of Burns and Stalker have suggested that creativity is
invigorated by loose structure.'" They have also suggested
that innovation, which partly relies on creativity, requires a
free flow of information." 5 The two go hand in hand. A loose
structure encourages the flow; a tight structure hinders it. So
why would anyone want a tight or mechanistic structure?
One possible answer to this question is that the mature in-
dustrial organization itself required a hierarchical structure in
which the few knowledgeable individuals (management) occu-
pied the top of the pyramid, while unskilled labor populated the
base. In other words, it takes a hierarchy to run the railroad
on time, or even to construct it. This answer, however, commits
us to the view that in any society where a significant discrep-
ancy in knowledge exists, a hierarchical structure would offer a
more efficient and rational system. This result presents two
problems. First, even in an Industrial society, we need to dif-
ferentiate among types of knowledge or information. Surely,
certain information may not be readily available or known to
workers by virtue of their position, such as market conditions,
strategic information and competitive threats. But other types
of information, such as ways in which the production process
can be rendered more efficient or the product improved, may be
enjoyed by all. So, it takes all kinds of knowledge to run an
efficient company. An authoritarian hierarchy, however, filters
out certain types of knowledge or information by de-legitimizing
it as not emanating from the top. The result is stagnation,
alienation and even miscalculation as opposed to innovation and
progress. In an environment which is not highly competitive,
such inefficiencies may not be fatal. But in today's market
where the threat is not to an entrepreneur but rather to the
technological leadership of the country as a whole, the problem
is more acute.
at 326; NoRD & TUCKER, supra note 179, at 15.
183. See BURNS & STALKER, supra note 179, at 9; Fairtlough, supra note 179, at
326.
184. See Fairtlough, supra note 179, at 327-28.
185. See id.
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The problems discussed in the previous paragraph mainly
relate to an industrial organizational structure. The amount of
power appropriated by the top of the hierarchy at the expense
of the base has resulted in "surplus repression."" Many au-
thors have discussed surplus repression and the malaise it has
brought with it into our societies.'87 Ironically, at the birth of
the Industrial Revolution, the Luddites opposed mechanization
because they were concerned that it would rob workers of their
livelihoods."e The pro-technologists hailed the new age as one
that would liberate the worker from the drudgery of work and
make life better for everyone. Both groups were wrong. Despite
the Luddites' fears, the new Industrial Age brought with it
many more jobs than the ones it made obsolete. On the other
hand, whereas the Industrial Revolution ultimately did usher in
a higher standard of living for all strata of society, it did not
liberate the worker from the drudgery of work. It introduced its
own form of drudgery.
In sum, the Industrial Revolution, augmented by such theo-
ries as Taylorism, gave rise internally to an alienated
workforce." 9 Alienation infected every aspect of the life of the
worker, and led to an increased amount of overall social unhap-
piness. This unhappy state of affairs resulted in significant in-
stabilities in Europe and even the United States, a serious
matter, given the lessons of Chinese history. As pointed out in
Section III, China had paid a high price for its own political
instability during the Middle Ages. Despite the fact that it was
on the verge of its own Industrial Revolution, China lost its
186. See HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
INTO FREUD 35 (1966).
187. See id. at 35-37; Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Radicalism in Law
and Criminology: A Retrospective View of Critical Legal Studies and Radical Criminol-
ogy, 84 J. CRnI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 502, 546 (1993); see also Jonathan Simon, Power
without Parents: Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOzo L. REV. 1363,
1409 (1995).
188. For more on the Luddites, see, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 23-26, and
J.F. Bergier, The Industrial Bourgeoisie and the Rise of the Working class 1700-1914,
in THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra
note 93, at 438-39.
189. See BURNS & STALKER, supra note 179, at 11; see also DRUCKER, supra note
4, at 97-107. "Taylorism" is a school of scientific management aimed at increasing
workers' productivity and efficiency through the observation and modification of their
practices. For more on Taylorism, see STEPHEN P. WARING, TAYLORISM TRANSFORMED:
SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT SINCE 1945, at 133-36 (1991).
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historical opportunity because of political instability. The insta-
bilities in Europe and the United States, however, were reme-
died by certain political compromises that may not have been
the most economically efficient.' The instabilities were also
reduced by a continuous rise in production and export.'9 ' Nei-
ther approach, however, is a satisfactory long term solution.
In the Industrial Age, industrial countries pried markets
open by resorting to such systems as colonialism and other
forms of international hegemony. 92 In the Information Age, it
is no longer necessary to access other countries' resources by re-
sorting to force. For example, the new modes of communication
have made it possible for an American company to employ low-
wage engineers in other parts of the world to do the work of an
American worker at a significantly lower cost.'93 This develop-
ment will have internal ramifications in the United States. The
internal ramifications may in turn affect the economic well-
being, even stability, of the country and lead to new compromis-
es, which again may not be the most economically efficient."9
Theoretically, the advances of the Informatics Revolution
have made it possible for the first time ever for United States'
firms to become truly global. In practice, we are already experi-
encing a significant proliferation of multinational companies
(MNC). These MNCs tend to have a centralized, authoritarian,
hierarchical structure in which headquarters play a major role.
Indeed, today some large organizations in Southeast Asia are
utilizing this kind of structure. This is particularly true of fami-
ly-owned and operated businesses.'95 The structure appears to
work efficiently and smoothly. There is no evidence of wide-
190. See ROE, supra note 75, at 205-09, 283-87 (arguing that "politics molded the
modern corporation," and that "it is worthwhile for academics to begin to consider
whether alternative financial and organizational forms would better resolve problems
of organization").
191. For more on the importance of increasing production in order to achieve labor
peace, see DRUCKER, supra note 4, at 110.
192. See HODGSON, supra note 77, at 176-77.
193. See Josh Clark, Brave New Work, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 1997, at 53;
Great Unknown Companies ... And Why You Should Know Them, INFO. WF., Sept.
16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12494727.
194. See ROE, supra note 75, at 283-87; see also George G. Triantis, Debt Financ-
ing and Motivation, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 1323 (1998).
195. See generally Jack W. Hou et al., Pacific Rim Trade and Development: His-
torical Environment and Future Prospects, CoNTEhP. EcON. POL'Y, Oct. 1, 1995, at 1.
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spread labor unrest in connection with these firms. So, how can
we account for this state of affairs?
Perhaps part of the answer lies in the economic conditions
and cultural/social values of other countries. For a variety of
such reasons, a non-Western worker abroad may find himself
more accepting of authoritarian hierarchical structures. Conse-
quently, a major element of internal instability at the
workplace is eliminated. In fact, it appears that even in the
United States, different workers have different cultural values
and hence, differing levels of tolerance for authoritarian struc-
tures. For example, workers in the Route 128 region appear to
be more tolerant of an authoritarian hierarchical structure than
their counterparts in Silicon Valley. For a while Route 128 did
very well, and is still a viable region, though it has lost its
leading edge. So, it is too simplistic to argue that hierarchical
organizations are doomed to extinction in the Information Age.
It is sufficient to examine briefly the Japanese model to refute
this argument. The Japanese firms have so far preserved their
overarching hierarchical structure even as they adjusted the
internal substructures to allow for increased information gather-
ing/consultative processes. These firms, many of which are in
the informatics industry, are leaders in their respective fields.
The argument about the waning of authority in the Informa-
tion Age carries a different force when evaluated in the context
of Western cultures. The mere fact that the argument is context
sensitive and that the context is cultural makes plain that the
argument is not based on the technological necessities of the
Information Age. Then what is it about the West that renders
the argument more defensible in its context? The answer is
Western political and economic path dependencies. As Mark Roe
and others have argued in another context, such path depen-
dencies cannot be ignored in discussing corporate governance
structures in the United States and elsewhere."
196. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and
History, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 217-22 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Chaos And Evolu-
tion in Law And Economics, 109 HARv. L. REv. 641, 643-58 (1996). See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GRowTH, STAGFLA-
TION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
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It is probative that the Industrial Revolution in Europe was
taking place at about the same time a political uprising for
greater freedom and self-determination was gaining strength
there. These demands arose for a variety of complex social and
political reasons better left to historians. The harbinger of these
demands was the French Revolution's call for equality, liberty
and fraternity. In time, these demands spread throughout Eu-
rope and the United States to give rise to new political institu-
tions called "democracies." The Western questioning of authority
was facilitated by the decay of the Western feudal order and
other centers of political/religious power. The Industrial Revolu-
tion, which brought with it a shift in economic and political
power towards the new emerging monied class, did not question
authority as such, but only the authority of the older re-
gime.'97 Consequently, it merely replaced one authority with
another, adapting the new form of authority to the new circum-
stances, including those of industrial production. Hence, hierar-
chical firms proliferated, and were even rationalized in terms of
more efficient production. Even Taylorism, which was about
efficiency, became a tool in the arsenal of hierarchical authority
to justify alienated, boring and fragmented labor.'98 Yet, one
can readily imagine a system which recognizes fragmented
"Taylorized" tasks but is, nevertheless, simultaneously both ef-
ficient and less alienating.
The claim being made in this section is that the issue of
corporate structure/governance is as much an ideological con-
struct as it is a response to material economic and technological
conditions. Therefore, it cannot be discussed without reference
to the consciousness of the society in which the structure is
being developed. Therein lies a paradox. If the claim that struc-
ture is in part ideologically motivated is true, then why did
firm structure in the Industrial Revolution not fail to exhibit
the same degree of openness and democracy which the political
system required? The answer has two parts.
197. See 11 NEw CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: MATERIAL PROGRESS AND WORLD-
WIDE PROBLEMS 11-17 (F. H. Hinsley ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1962). See generally
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 573-88.
198. See WARING, supra note 189, at 133-36. See generally FROIMM, supra note 53,
at 118-123; HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 22-34 (1964).
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First, the political system itself took a long time to imple-
ment the values it proclaimed. Even then, it did so imperfectly.
The French Revolution, for example, spawned a hundred years
of terror, followed by the installation of an emperor, Napoleon.
Second, human consciousness, despite its heroic efforts, usually
evolves into radically different changes rather than engage in a
"radical conversion." 99 Thus, even as the French masses were
calling for equality, it took time to understand the content and
repercussions of such a demand. It then took a longer time be-
fore that information "sank into" the human psyche.
For this reason, we find even today in the United States
business "leaders" who are still operating under a dated hierar-
chical/authoritarian ideology."' To the extent that the workers
in such organizations (at the various levels, including manageri-
al) do not find the structure oppressive or are willing to toler-
ate it, the organization will function very well in the short and
perhaps intermediate term. To the extent they are bothered by
the structure, it is an inefficient system to adopt. Here, we are
only speaking about production efficiency in the narrowest
sense. We are not taking into account the (non/slow) innovation
costs of such an organization in a competitive milieu.
Alternatively, we find business "leaders" promoting organiza-
tions that have relatively flat structures. Despite the well-
meaning approach, such structures may not be efficient in a
milieu where the worker is still ideologically committed, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to an authoritarian arrangement.
This is why, for example, Silicon Valley's flat structures were
easier to introduce in "new frontier" California than in the
traditional society of Massachusetts.
In other words, a firm operating within a society needs to
choose the most advanced techniques suitable to that particular
199. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHNGNESS: AN ESSAY ON
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 257 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., Phil. Libr. ed. 1956)
(defining the notion of "radical conversion); see also ROE, supra note 196, at 650
(stating that "once a society has invested in its institutions, it has many reasons not
to change them radically, or at all, because the costs of change might outweigh any
advantages from change?). A society's reluctance to change is also an expression of its
path dependencies. See id.
200. See Bruce Orwall & Joann S. Lublin, If a Company Prospers, Should Its Di-
rectors Behave by the Book?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at Al.
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society. These techniques include production techniques and
organizational ones. The two must go hand in hand in order to
provide the best possible combination in that society. If they
are unsuited to or incompatible with each" other, the enterprise
might simply wither away after suffering for a period of time.
Two European professors, F. Lissoni of Italy and J.S. Metcalf
of Britain, have concluded that "compatibility [of innovation
with existing technology], inter-relatedness and co-development
are emerging as important themes in modern diffusion [of inno-
vation] research.""1 They argued that what is being diffused
is not a single innovation, but a sequence of innovations devel-
oping in response to competing and complementary configura-
tions in an environment which consists of many other technolo-
gies.02 In the context of this discussion, I would modify their
insightful statement in two ways. First, I would point out that
innovations are not simply serial but have a rather complex
matrix of relations that develop in all unpredicted directions.
Second, I would replace the reference to technology with one to
"technique," a more inclusive term which recognizes that inno-
vation goes beyond the classical definition to include organiza-
tional structures, language and other elements that constitute
our human-made milieu. °3
In other words, a society is not a tabula rasa. It has embed-
ded in it a variety of techniques and technologies, such as au-
thoritarianism, consultative traditions, and agricultural and
industrial inventions all of which render some innovations more
readily suited for adoption than others. This is the broader
sense of path dependency that others have mentioned. Path
dependency was very much at work in Britain, for example, a
monarchy which at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution
produced a large number of innovations related to the textile
industry. Clearly, a major reason for the concentration of inno-
vation and production in textiles and related areas was the
widespread pre-industrial (agricultural) technologies and favor-
able conditions in Britain relating to textiles, such as weaving,
201. F. Lissoni & J.S. Metcalfe, Diffusion of Innovation Ancient and Modern: A Re-
view of the Main Themes, in HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 107.
202. See id.
203. For more on the use of the term "technique," see J. Ellul, The Technological
Order, in TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 205-14.
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spinning, and the colonization of cotton-rich Egypt and India.
Thus, the invention of the cotton jenny, steam mill and a whole
other set of inventions not only represented a significant stride
forward in a society with a mostly agrarian technological config-
uration, but it also represented valuable complementary tech-
nology.'
Yet for a system of monarchy, such as Britain's, with well-
defined political and social hierarchies, even though they may
be loosening, it would have been difficult to adopt a so-
cial/industrial technique based on equality and consultation
with workers. It would require an ideological revolution or a
schizophrenic national psyche to institute technological advanc-
es that could be instituted more cheaply in terms of social cost
under existing ideological authoritarian arrangements. Hence,
while technology offered a chance for liberating humanity from
drudgery, that potential was not tapped in Britain. On the
other hand, the United States, which rejected a system of mon-
archy and fought several wars in order to secure a more open
and democratic society, was able to lead the way in instituting
more egalitarian structures in the workplace. These structures
produced a higher rate of innovation and helped the United
States acquire the technological leadership of the world. The
next country to achieve that distinction would be one which
has, among other things, an ideological superstructure which
enables it to institute even more open organizational structures
in the search for a higher rate of innovation.
Before ending this part of the discussion, we should note
that, while the role of ideology in influencing organizational
structures is undeniably important, technologies do have pro-
pensities that themselves influence the final outcome. The me-
chanical technologies of the Industrial Revolution had the pro-
pensity to liberate and introduce into society greater equality.
For this reason, the authoritarian hierarchy of the factory be-
came more subtle and less restrictive than that of the feudal
lord. Similarly, the technology of the Information Age has a
204. See P. Bairoch, Agriculture & the Industrial Revolution, in THE FONTANA
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, supra note 93, at 486-87; HODGSON, supra note 77, at
207-19; see also HENDERSON, supra note 76, at 45-66; Lissoni & Metcalfe, supra note
201, at 106.
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propensity to be even more liberating. It is helpful to outline
now some of the ways in which it does that.
Propensities of the Information Age. Unlike the Industrial
Age, the Information Age is based mainly on knowledge, not
muscle. Its skilled workers are generally trained in areas of
science and technology. So, they tend to derive their self-esteem
from their profession, and they care about the quality of their
lives. 5 They also tend not to be "organization men.""°
These facts contribute to their increased mobility. Additionally,
their scientific training makes them open to data-gathering,
free discussion and critique. A centralized, authoritarian milieu
is not readily compatible with these traits. In attending to the
"quality of life" issue, these and other workers are refusing to
dedicate themselves to the organization and are opting instead
for a more balanced personal life. The dissatisfaction afflicting
skilled workers, among others, usually infects them with a mal-
aise which is later reflected in reduced productivity and even a
poorer quality of production. In a market in which the supply
of skilled labor is inelastic and the cost of producing skilled
labor is high, it makes a great deal of sense to reorganize firms
in ways that are more efficient and productive. In this age, this
means organizing firms in structures that are less oppressive
and more inspiring to the worker. In short, the knowledge-
based economy works more efficiently if organized along demo-
cratic structures. There is no one such structure, and the select-
ed structure may differ from one community/society to another,
but the main features of open communication and non-author-
itarian arrangements are critical to it.
As the supply of skilled labor becomes more available over-
seas, especially in countries where authoritarian structures are
prevalent, MNCs may decide to keep their centralized authori-
tarian structures in the name of Industrial Age efficiency and
abandon the "affluent and spoiled" American workers for the
cheaper, less demanding foreign worker. This approach, howev-
er, has serious limitations. First, the number of skilled workers
205. See CHARLES HANDY, THE AGE OF PARADOX 259-60 (1994).
206. See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 263-66 (Harper Torchbooks 1962);
JOHN J. TARRANT, DRUCKER: THE MAN WHO INVENTED CORPORATE SOCIETY 41 (1976).
See generally WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
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available to MNCs abroad is relatively limited. Second, despite
the ability to telecommunicate, distance can create its own
problems; for example, it will slow down the rate of diffusion of
(hands-on) knowledge/information within the company. Third,
MNCs have to compete with local companies for overseas work-
ers, and a worker's commitment to the technological develop-
ment of her own country may play a role. Fourth, while initial-
ly cheaper, skilled workers will soon recognize the existing gap
in salaries and try to narrow it by making demands on the
MNC, by building bridges with American labor movements or
immigrating to the United States (the "brain drain" phenome-
non).20 7
Therefore, an American company interested in long term
competitive productivity and stability must start re-examining
its managerial techniques and updating them so that they may
become better suited to the historical and technological era in
which we live. This is a conclusion that many authors have
reached through various analyses. In particular, the well-known
author Peter Drucker has argued that the manager of the fu-
ture must earn the trust of the workers.21 Critical of the con-
descending behavior of Industrial Age managers and cognizant
of the special characteristics of the Information Age, Drucker
concluded that management must seek a relationship of part-
nership with its workers. Comparing this era to the prior one,
he said: "[iin making and moving things [in the Industrial
Age], partnership with the responsible worker is... only the
best way-after all, Taylor's telling them worked, too, and quite
well. In knowledge and service work, partnership with the re-
sponsible worker is the only way; nothing else will work at
all."
2 0 9
Drucker points out that the Japanese attempts in the Fifties
and Sixties to return to prewar autocracy in the plant resulted
in bloody clashes and severe conflicts.210 This led to a "loosen-
207. See Hamm, supra note 13, at 123; see also DRUCKER, supra note 4, at 38-41.
208. See DRUCKER, supra note 4, at 122.
209. Id. at 107 (emphasis in the original).
210. See id.
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ing" of Japanese plant structure which accommodated input
from workers and led to the flourishing of Japanese industry.
Now that I have established the importance of structure for
productivity and the structural qualities best suited for the
Information Age, I will briefly examine vertical, virtual and
other structures in light of my conclusions.
V. CORPORATE STRUCTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Vertical organizations are hierarchical organizations, with
various layers of management between the top manag-
er/entrepreneur and the bottom employee/worker. Virtual orga-
nizations are the paradigm of Toffier's 'hollowing out" organiza-
tions. In a virtual organization, the structure is pared down to
the bare essentials of the business.2 ' All other functions are
outsourced to other companies. This approach rejects the con-
cept of vertical integration and the relationship of the firms is
mainly contractual."' In one sense, a network of organizations
is created through this outsourcing. The resulting network may
be regarded as an advanced form of the Medieval "putting out"
network, which was structurally much simpler and involved
individuals rather than companies.21 There are other types of
networks of relations in Silicon Valley as well. Which of these
structures is optimal for the new Information Age?
It is clear from the earlier discussion that small, flat organi-
zational structures are very helpful for generating innovations,
especially fundamentally new ones, and that large authoritarian
hierarchical structures are not. Consequently, one may draw
the conclusion that large hierarchical/vertical firms are bad for
innovation and thus undesirable. This conclusion is unwarrant-
ed for many reasons that will be discussed in greater detail
below. First, it overlooks the fact that large firms have made
some contributions to innovation, especially incremental im-
211. See C. Dickerson, Virtual Versus Vertical: Vectors in Organizational Gover-
nance 1-2, 12 (July 7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the International
Conference on Socio-Economics, Montreal, Canada, on file with the University of Rich-
mond Law Review). This paper contains an excellent discussion of the governance
issues arising in various structures.
212. See id.
213. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
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provements on innovations made by smaller firms. Second, it
overlooks the economic power of these large firms which allows
them to capitalize upon, and mainstream, radically new innova-
tions. The spreading of these innovations through
mainstreaming is particularly important because it facilitates
the cross-fertilization of ideas, thus leading to further innova-
tion.
This Section develops these observations further and argues
that, despite its drawbacks, the large firm continues to have a
role in today's corporate landscape. Furthermore, the section
examines more closely the notion of hierarchy and argue that
virtual corporations and networks are not necessarily less au-
thoritarian in their internal and external relations than vertical
organizations. Further it is argued that while certain organiza-
tional forms have their own propensities, the actual relationship
within the firm depends on more than its adopted structural
form. It depends on the extent, if any, to which the top exercis-
es control on the bottom. In conclusion, while the Information
Age has provided the small firm with unprecedented advantag-
es, large vertical firms not organized as autarkic hierarchies
will continue to play a role in the future economy and have not
been rendered obsolete.
Firm size. The observations and arguments presented above
about the relation of the size of the firm to the rate of innova-
tion have been bolstered by various studies. One relatively
recent study conducted in the United States concluded that the
average innovation rate of small firms is considerably higher
than that of large firms. 14 It also discovered that many
(though not all) of the large firm innovations were incremental
improvements upon the more "radical" or basic innovations of
small firms.215 These improvements, however, are quite impor-
214. See ZOLTAN Acs & DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 50
(1990).
215. See id. at 50-53; see also Patrick J. Rondeau & Bhal J. Bhatt, A Framework
For Assessing Product Innovation Strategies In A Competitive Context, 2 ADVANCES IN
COMPETITIVE RESEARCH 3 4-5 (1994) (classifying the development of new products and
discussing different types of innovation, such as "incremental," "synthetic," and "dis-
continuous" innovations. The last refers to the development of previously non-existent
products.).
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tant for capitalizing on an innovation by opening more possibili-
ties for its exploitation.216
The same study found that the large firm innovation rate
exceeded the small firm innovation rate in certain indus-
tries.' These industries tended to be, among other things,
capital-intensive, in concentrated markets, or in markets with
significant structural barriers.2"8 Thus, in today's economic cli-
mate, the innovational contribution of a firm appears to be, at
least in part, industry dependent. This is especially true of
more advanced generations of innovative informatics products,
such as chips. Each generation essentially renders the one be-
fore it obsolete, yet each requires a very high capital invest-
ment for its development, testing and production. Significantly,
the cycle of innovation in chips, for example, has been repeated
every few years. As a result, a continuous ability to make such
large capital outlays is required.219 This state of affairs makes
it difficult for a small firm to compete successfully over the long
term.
Small firms have other long-term problems. Once the decision
to manufacture a product is made, the product usually needs to
be launched, mass-produced, marketed and advertised. In Sili-
con Valley, where small companies have direct contacts with
one another, it is possible, initially, to locate buyers without
such a campaign. But when the product reaches a more mature
stage, then either the small company has to grow, or it will
lose ground to an imitator, with perhaps a slightly improved
product, who can grow.
The loss of the United States market share in semiconductors
to Japan in the late Eighties is a case in point.' Silicon Val-
ley was experiencing a boom then, yet Japanese firms were
able to move ahead and capture the lead in market share from
the United States in the semiconductor industry."m Some
216. See Acs & AuDRETSCH, supra note 214, at 54 (quoting Scherer's conclusion
that, "No single firm size is uniquely conductive to technological progress. There is
room for firms of all sizes.").
217. See id. at 53-55.
218. See id. at 54-56.
219. See generally Hobday, supra note 4, at 163.
220. See id. at 155.
221. See id.
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blame that loss on the fact that the Silicon Valley network of
firms involved at that time in semiconductor production lacked
adequate "complementary assets," i.e., the ability to produce,
market and distribute on a large scale, as well as commit the
necessary financial resources.' Surely there were exceptions,
but not enough to salvage the situation. It was only after large
firms in Silicon Valley, such as Intel, revised their strategies to
gain a larger share of the market, that the United States was
able to recapture the lead from the Japanese in the Nine-
ties.'
In concluding that large firms serve an important function in
our economy, it is important to keep in mind that some of the
arguments used in support of that conclusion are becoming
rapidly obsolete. For example, the recent explosion of Internet
communication has radically changed the rules of raising funds,
marketing and advertising. Some small companies that would
have ordinarily solicited the help of an expensive underwriter
in order to tap the capital markets have now dispensed with
that expense by marketing their own securities on the
Internet.' This development will produce related securities
laws for the protection of investors purchasing through this
medium.' The rules, however, will not prohibit offers made
through the Internet; they will only regulate them.' This
means that small companies have been significantly empowered
by the new technology. This new power translates into de-
creased costs and increased profits.
222. See id. at 154-55.
223. See ici
224. There are now Internet services available to match a venture with capital.
See, e.g., Capital Matchmaker (visited Sept. 24, 1997) <httpl//www.matchmaker.org(-
capital/>; Wit Capital (visited Sept. 30, 1997) <http'//www.witcapital.com>.
225. The SEC is currently "reevaluating its approach to the regulation of ex-
changes and other markets in light of technological advances and the corresponding
growth of alternative trading systems ... ." Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,38672, May 23, 1997, available in 1997 SEC LEXIS 1178. The
Internet services themselves take no responsibility for ensuring that the on-line secu-
rities solicitations they publish are in conformity with existing securities laws. See,
e.g., Capital Matchmaker (visited Sept. 24, 1997) <http://www.matchmaker.orgcapital/-
legal.htm>; Wit Capital (visited Sept. 30, 1997) <http:/www.witcapital.com/rules/buy-
ing.html>; see also Michael Krantz, Moguls by the Million, TnM, Sept. 29, 1997, at
43.
226. See, e.g., Real Goods Trading Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, June 24,
1996, available in 1996 SEC LEXIS 566.
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Similarly, a small innovative company with a new product
can significantly reduce the cost of launching and marketing
that product by resorting to Internet advertising.' This new
freedom from traditional market players/authorities democratiz-
es and decentralizes the market in ways that can only spur the
innovative spirit. It also presents a challenge to the small firm
as the firm's product matures. Given a small firm's limited
resources, human and other, it may not be able to continue
marketing and supplying the maturing product without adverse-
ly impacting its valuable innovative capabilities. At that point,
the small firm may want to outsource a certain function (or
license or sell that product) to another firm willing to dedicate
itself to the maturing product. Usually, this other firm would
be a large, established firm.
Another trend which adds to the viability of small companies
is the existence of active and significant joint venture capital.
Joint venturers have helped finance many technolo-
gists/entrepreneurs with innovative ideas. Despite some inter-
mittent losses, the returns on successful joint ventures have
been very lucrative. At the present, so long as small companies
continue to innovate, joint venture capital is available to fi-
nance them. This availability diminishes the need, in the case
of a capital intensive project/product, for vertically-integrated
firms with large capital reserves.
Clearly, the new Information Age has made it easier for the
small firm to survive longer without the need to evolve into a
vertical structure, which may reduce its communicative and
innovative capabilities. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, there
remain residual reasons for a firm to opt to grow larger and
adopt a hierarchical organizational structure. Therefore, in
evaluating the optimal corporate structure for the United
States, there appears to be no single optimal structure. It de-
pends, among other things, on concomitant technological, indus-
trial and economic conditions. Small, nimble corporate struc-
tures are important for continued, especially radically new,
innovation. It is easier to maintain a high level of open commu-
nication within such small structures. They also are not sty-
227. See, e.g., AT&T (visited Sept. 24, 1997) <http://att.com/business/feature>
(featuring different businesses that have been successful marketing directly on-line).
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mied by slow bureaucracies. Larger firms are important for
producing certain types of innovation, for the incremental devel-
opment of innovations, as well as for capturing the market for
innovations at the mature stage. They have the structure that
makes it possible to engage, on a regular basis, in large scale
actions. But isn't the large firm's ability to act on a large scale
the result of its bureaucratic organization? In other words,
could bureaucracy be good after all? The next Section considers
these issues.
Firm structure. Regardless of size, the question remains as to
what type of structure is optimal for an organization. The dis-
cussion has indicated that an authoritarian hierarchical struc-
ture, even in a small organization, is detrimental to the free
flow of information and hence to the technical progress of the
company. It also has detrimental effects on labor. But are there
non-authoritarian hierarchies? If so, are those also detrimental?
There are a variety of hierarchical structures. Some authors
have referred to "horizontal" as opposed to "vertical"
hierarchies.' The term appears to be an oxymoron. It sug-
gests both at once: a vertical structure and its absence. A hori-
zontal hierarchy is a relatively flat vertical hierarchy, i.e., it is
a single tranche hierarchy. Because horizontal hierarchies elimi-
nate intermediaries between the entrepreneur and the manag-
ers, the direct link tends to mean more control by the entre-
preneur.' Thus, this structure, which is well-suited for small
companies, turns out to be potentially more authoritarian than
a "less horizontal" one.
Elaborate hierarchies tend to dilute control from the top by
allowing middle managers the opportunity to share in it. From
the point of view of labor, however, the source of control is not
as significant as its extent, depth, and even its very existence
as a mode of management/labor relation. So, the laborer's view
is not significantly different as between the two forms of hierar-
chy. Either arrangement, whether vertical or horizontal, could
be highly oppressive.
228. See R. Rajan and L. Zingales, The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy 20 (1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
229. See id
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A climate of control breeds distrust between management and
employees, thus creating an adversarial relationship rather
than a productive one. This increases the manager's worry
about security issues, including the appropriation of technologi-
cal know-how and the formation of competing companies by
departing labor. Such a scenario did take place at the early
stages of development in Silicon Valley, which was not good for
the Fairchild company." ° Yet, the Company's departing skilled
labor became a major source of new, small, innovative compa-
nies which had a favorable impact on the industry and the
country.'
1
Later, other firms in the Silicon Valley learned from the
Fairchild experience. They assisted, rather than warred with,
defecting skilled labor. The reason these firms were able to
relax their attempts to control departing skilled labor was only
partially related to the nature of the Information Age. Other
factors were as, if not more, important. For example, the region
in which these firms were located is well-known for its aversion
to traditional authoritarian structures. 2 This fact appears to
have affected the firms themselves by giving them unique fea-
tures that distinguished them from firms in more traditional
regions, such as Route 128 in Massachusetts. This "cultural"
difference is certainly aided by the fact that intellectual assets
of the Information Age are harder to protect (at present) than
physical assets, that the products of the new age become obso-
lete quickly, and that there is a small pool of skilled labor. In
the presence of a "high-control" culture, however, it is easy to
imagine how the technological factors could readily translate
into a highly authoritarian structure determined to achieve
success through increased policing and restriction of workers'
mobility.
The key concept in this discussion is not "hierarchy" but
"control." Whereas hierarchies provide many opportunities with-
in the structure to establish control, they do not have to. It is
possible to imagine a relatively innocuous (unabused) hierarchy
based on cooperative modes of organization in which everyone
230. See SAXENI4N, supra note 3, at 25-26.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 50-51, 53.
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is "connected" to the (functional) top and has full-fledged input
in the project in which she is involved (communication as op-
posed to control). This modified structure, the "inverted tree"
model, will require a modified consciousness that does not crave
control. This consciousness, as argued earlier, is the product of
a variety of social and political developments. The Information
Age does not bring it about; it is simply better suited to it,
given the entrepreneur's reliance on skilled labor. Today's cli-
mate in the United States as a whole is conducive to the devel-
opment of a less controlling consciousness. Conditions suitable
for a mentality less interested in autarkic controls are created
by the environmental and feminist movements at their best, the
resurgence of religious/spiritual consciousness (as opposed to
political religious movements), demand for a less powerful cen-
tral/federal government and even the United States Constitu-
tion, especially as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The managerial structure of Hewlett Packard, labeled MBO
(management by objective), illustrates this point. This structure,
we are told, is the "antithesis of management by control."' It
is a system in which "overall objectives are clearly stated and
agreed upon."' Packard suggests that workers have an input
in this process, the extent and vertical reach of which will de-
termine the extent of internal corporate democracy."
Drucker's optimistic view of the coming managerial change is
that managers will need to "learn to manage in situations
where you don't have command authority, where you are nei-
ther controlled nor controlling." The internal structure of
the emerging organization, according to Drucker, is one of "mu-
tual understanding and responsibility." 7
It is important to note that when applied, the MBO method
will nevertheless vary from one company to another, and from
one historical era or region to another. This variation will sure-
ly test its democratic content from one extreme to another. It is
conceivable that under autarkic political developments, the
MBO structure (or some other "democratically biased" structure)
233. See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 152.
234. Id. at 152.
235. See id. at 153-59.
236. Harris, supra note 6, at 115.
237. Id. at 122.
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could be substantially emptied from any real democratic con-
tent. The answer to labor's suffering therefore lies at least as
much in societal/cultural values as it does in technology. I
would therefore modify McLuhan's slogan to say "[a] medium is
an important part of the message," with the medium here being
the mode of organization. 8 A structure certainly has its pro-
pensities, but it does not predetermine the outcome.
Virtual corporations and networks suffer from similar vulner-
abilities. Each of these two forms of organization allows firms
to express, within their boundaries, the corporate governance
culture they prefer. To that extent, they are no different from
other firms. It may appear, however, that because of the con-
tractual outsourcing relation between a virtual corporation (the
"center") and other firms (the "spokes"), that the relation is,
therefore, less controlled; but this need not be the case. In fact,
some centers will try to exert as much control on the spokes as
they can." That level of control may exceed one in a verti-
cally organized democratically-oriented firm. Thus, mere paring
of functions and shifting of production to other companies does
not in itself promote corporate democracy within the company
or between the center and its spokes. It may, however, make it
somewhat more difficult for networks. Nevertheless, similar
arguments could be made about the relation of various firms
within a network. The network firm, with the highest craving
for control, may end up maneuvering to control the other firms
in the network. So, neither form is optimal as a non-authoritar-
ian structure, although both have external propensities favoring
such structure.
Therefore, it would appear that a choice of a corporate struc-
ture made to maximize innovation and economic viability must
be combined with a serious effort to reeducate management and
labor about responsible egalitarian governance. The structure
itself should be chosen in light of other criteria as well. For
example, if the firm is mass-producing a mature product, then
it may be advisable to adopt a vertical hierarchy. On the other
hand, if it is located in a region rich with small entrepreneurs
238. For a discussion of McLuhan's original slogan, see supra notes 62-74 and
accompanying text.
239. See Dickerson, supra note 211, at 20.
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ready to supply it with components, then perhaps it should opt
for a virtual structure or networking. A company may even
decide to both participate in a mature industry and benefit
from continued related innovations internally and externally.
Given certain economic factors, such a company may have to
opt for a vertical hierarchy. In that case, it needs to devise an
internal governance structure which reduces internal control
and thus spurs innovation within the firm. The company may
also invest in small firms with flat non-authoritarian structures
and promising research. The investment approach will preserve
each firm's structural advantage while giving both firms a sig-
nificant economic advantage. As the small firm matures, it may
even decide to merge with the large firm, given a suitable cor-
porate culture. Therefore, the optimal structure for a firm is a
versatile structure which is sufficiently flexible so as to capi-
talize on all emerging possibilities of interest to the firm. A
single structure offers no guarantees and may be constrictive
under certain market or other conditions.
VI. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE INFORMATION AGE
The above discussion shows that while the size of a firm and
its structure have certain propensities towards encouraging
innovation within that firm, the ultimate determinant remains
its ideological/cultural human dynamic. As stated earlier, a
culture of control breeds distrust between management and
employees, leading to an adversarial relation fraught with ten-
sions.' On the other hand, a co-operative democratic culture
facilitates building trust between the two groups and produces
a friendlier and more productive working place.
The Coming Cultural/Ideological Shift. There are many ways
in which a cooperative non-hierarchical culture may be fostered
in a firm. Open door policies and flexible hours are examples of
minimal ways that do not require a radical departure from our
Industrial Age consciousness. For this reason, their effect will
also be minimal. Other ways may represent such a radical
departure from tradition that they present us with a totally
different conception of the firm, corporate law and human be-
240. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
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ings. In the latter case, our consciousness will need time to
contemplate these ways, and therefore it may take decades
before the worldview they are based upon is accepted and in-
ternalized.
A case in point is the change in consciousness related to the
Industrial Revolution. The passage from the Agricultural to the
Industrial Age required a fundamental ideological/conceptual
shift. Under the old feudal system, humans could be owned as
property, and under the new industrial system, humans are
viewed as free agents who could dispose of their own labor as
they choose. Originally, the economic model represented by the
free craftsmen in Europe was negligible compared to the feudal
model."' In time, however, the feudal model became economi-
cally, technologically and politically obsolete, causing a great
deal of chaos and unrest. The price paid for establishing this
ideological/conceptual shift in the United States was a civil war.
The Information Age is bringing with it an ideologi-
cal/conceptual shift of similar magnitude. There are phenomena
that already point in that direction. For example, labor has
found new strength after a series of losses. During the last
decade alone, labor suffered through downsizing, plant closings,
escalating executive salaries and the rise in the number of
temporary workers. These developments led various writers to
become concerned about matters ranging from possible labor
unrest to the social implications of the existing system. 2 Sev-
eral writers have concluded that the present corporate/economic
system is in dire need of reexamination. They offered to remedy
the situation by proposing, for example, profit sharing, employ-
ee stock ownership, codetermination by workers, fiduciary du-
ties by directors towards stakeholders and shareholder activism
by labor.'
241. See generally ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, supra note 76, at 551-54.
242. See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (L. Mitchell ed., 1995); Joann S.
Lublin, Executive Pay (A Special Report), WALL ST. J., April 11, 1996, at R1.
243. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 242; see also Richard Freeman,
Employee Councils, Worker Participation, and Other Squishy Stuff, 43RD ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS (Indus. Rel. Res. Ass'n Series, Madison, Wis.), Dec. 1990, at 328.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of
United Air Lines, (1996) (unpublished manuscript, Sloan Conference, Columbia Uni-
versity) (on file with the University of Richmond Law Review); Marleen A. O'Connor,
Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capi-
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The problem, however, is more fundamental. The basic imbal-
ance in today's corporate structure lies in the fact that as a
result of various historical political developments, control has
become concentrated in the hands of a few, its top managers.
Combined with a hierarchical Industrial Age legal system of
corporate governance, these managers' primary responsibility
has become one of maximizing profits for the sharehold-
ers/owners. Other corporate constituencies suffer from this tun-
nel vision. To ameliorate this situation, the above suggestions
were made. While all of them are designed to improve the eco-
nomic lot of the employees, among others, none of them suf-
ficiently address the fundamental issue of corporate democracy.
The term "corporate democracy" usually refers to shareholder
rights, which reflects a view of the corporation as a polis where
only the "owners of shares" count as citizens. In political terms,
shareholders of a corporation are the only citizens of the corpo-
rate polis, and only citizens vote. Put in this way, we now rec-
ognize that our legal system does not view non-shareholders as
"citizens." This is analogous to a familiar political situation in
our past where only landowners had the right to vote in an
election and the non-landed, non-owners had no voting rights.
We have since recognized in the political arena that those who
do not own land are nevertheless an integral part of the citi-
zenship of our country. The same recognition seems to be over-
due in corporate law and practice. Getting to it, however, will
require a major ideological/conceptual shift not only in the con-
cept of "corporate citizenship," but also in the concept of the
"corporation" itself.'
The corporation is not just a production unit, a "cash cow," or
a profit center; it has become a community for all those in it.
People spend most of their waking hours at work in the corpo-
ration; they make friends there, have meals there, and derive
talism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345 (1997) [hereinafter O'Connor, Organized Labor];
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law To
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899, 936-40 (1993).
244. An interesting article which provides a different set of arguments for similar
conclusions is that of David Ellerman, The Human-Capital-ist Firm: An Approach
from Property Theory and Democratic Theory (1997) (presented at the Conference on
Human Capital and the Theory of the Firm, The Brookings Institute) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Richmond Law Review).
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much of their self-esteem from work. A corporation is therefore
an important community for those who work in it, and it signif-
icantly impacts on the society in which it is imbedded. Con-
versely, a corporation derives significant benefits from that
society. Consequently, it may no longer define its goals in isola-
tion from, or in disregard of, the encompassing society. The tra-
ditional goal of maximizing profits must now be tempered by
other considerations including specific, as well as overarching,
communal goals. These goals must be determined primarily by
the corporation's community, but with an eye to the overarching
goals of society. Several events in the last decade have pointed
to this shift in our view of the corporation. The shift, however,
has been slow and incremental. All of its consequences have not
been fully recognized. We have also not yet reflected it ade-
quately in our legal system.
For example, after an extended period of hesitation and de-
bate, society rejected the self-centered approach of corporations
that maximized profits at the expense of our shared environ-
ment and the health of American citizens. The rejection, howev-
er, took a very limited form such as passing environmental
laws and cigarette regulations. The basic problem, namely the
very concept of the corporation as an insular societal entity
concerned only with shareholders profits, remains unchanged.
Consequently, other manifestations of this problem, such as
those that emerged in the mergers and acquisitions era of the
Eighties, are also being approached with further piece-meal
remedies. This slow process is costly in a globally competitive
environment, yet our legal corporate system continues to lag
behind the new facts.
In the meantime, employees of the firm can only be heard if
they present themselves as owners, i.e., as something other
than employees. This unfortunate fact has accelerated the devel-
opment of a new phenomenon: the shareholder/employee activ-
ist.' By being both a "citizen" of the corporation and a "non-
citizen/employee" as well, the shareholder/employee activist
attempts to bridge the existing gap in democratic corporate
governance. But, by resorting to this method of communica-
245. For further discussion, see O'Connor, Organized Labor, supra note 243, at
1345-54.
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tion/representation, the shareholder/employee is underlining the
obsolescence of the traditional dichotomy between owners and
employees in the area of corporate governance. If the dichotomy
increasingly makes no sense, then it becomes increasingly easi-
er to discard it. The dichotomy has traditionally been justified
for various reasons. Major among them is the reified view of
the employee as not being "smart" enough to be an owner. The
shareholder/employee activist does not only challenge this per-
ception, but also illustrates on a periodical basis the inefficien-
cies involved in the circuitous mode of communication with
managers and shareholders required by the present system.
What is really needed, as indicated earlier, is a truly participa-
tory workplace in which employees actively communicate their
views about the workplace and the production process. They
also share in the decision making, especially in the areas of
their expertise and concern.
The benefits of involving workers in the decision-making
process has been adequately illustrated in Japan and Germa-
ny.' But the level of participation being advocated for the
United States in the Information Age requires a fundamental
leveling of autarkic hierarchies, a democratic partnership be-
tween owners and employees with a common/communal goal
and destiny. Codetermination and profit-sharing would take the
firm part of the way towards that goal, but without full corpo-
rate democracy, the employees will continue to feel alienated,
helpless and frustrated. These negative feelings reflect them-
selves in the behavior of the employees and tend to be ex-
pressed in lack of commitment, initiative and enthusiasm. Since
many of these employees are technicians, the level of innovation
and performance in the firm is likely to suffer as a result.
Reassessing the Role of Human Capital. The ideological/con-
ceptual shift, which appears to be facilitated by the age of com-
munication, participation, cooperation and full-fledged democra-
cy, redefines capital contributions to the firm so as to include
non-financial forms. In the Industrial Age, where capital was in
great demand and short supply, a special privilege was accord-
ed to those who were monied. They became "owners" of the
firm in which they invested their money. The primary index of
246. See generally HANDY, supra note 205, at 100-01.
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this ownership was control. By assigning legal control to own-
ers, other constituencies of the corporation were denied it. Our
legal structure reflects this choice.
Reality, however, reflects newer facts. Managers, a later
Industrial Age phenomenon consisting of a newly-emerged class
of skilled labor, were able to wrest effective control from the
owners through a series of historical developments. Recently,
we have heard about the attempt of institutional investors to
reestablish corporate democracy." That attempt is really a
return to industrial democracy which reserves ownership rights
only to financial capital. The corporate democracy necessitated
by the Information Age has made the Industrial view obsolete.
The clout of managers in today's corporations attests to this
fact.
In the Information Age, financial capital is abundant and
skilled human capital is in short supply. As a result, a new
pattern has emerged in which those with exceptional technologi-
cal, managerial, engineering and other needed skills were com-
pensated in large part with an ownership interest in the corpo-
ration in exchange for their human capital contributions. Be-
cause of the questionable application of this new principle with
respect to top managers in autarkic corporations, this develop-
ment became so controversial that new disclosure rules for
compensation were promulgated by the SEC.'
The principle, however, has been established. While in tradi-
tional firms it was applied only to top managers, in Silicon
Valley it has been broadened to include not only computer engi-
neers and software innovators, but also, for example, secretar-
ies." Once we recognize that human capital is another form
of corporate contribution/investment, there is no rational argu-
ment for compensating an engineer's contribution with equity
and then deny the same treatment to a secretarial contribution.
247. See Richard H. Koppes, Corporate Governance, NATVL L.J., Apr. 14, 1997, at
B5.
248. See Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder Lists and Mailing Re-
quests, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7032, Nov. 22, 1993, available in 1993 SEC
LEXIS 3215.
249. Only a limited number of secretaries, however, have been so fortunate. See
Hamm, supra note 13, at 135. Again, as stated in the text relating to note 36, the
Valley has its darker side.
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That is not to say that the value of the contributions are neces-
sarily the same. But, if one is a form of capital, so is the other.
After all, a shareholder who invests a single dollar in a corpo-
ration is as much of a shareholder and "owner" as one who has
invested a million dollars.
The Industrial Age bias toward financial capital is no longer
rational and needs to be reviewed. In the new Age, both contri-
butions should reap the same kind of benefits. Under this sce-
nario, profit-sharing is no longer regarded as a matter of firm
policy, but as an employee right; just as compensating a worker
in industrialized Europe was not regarded as an expression of
the feudal lord's kindness, but as a right of the worker. This
ideological/conceptual shift is not yet obvious, but its indicators
are already with us.
Historically, political changes and economic/technological
changes have gone together hand-in-hand, some preceding or
following others by a few decades. There is no good reason to
argue that this time around the situation will be different. The
political situation has certainly been evolving towards increased
and improved democratic structures. In such a case, the struc-
ture of corporate governance cannot lag much behind.
The Silicon Valley example cracks the door open to the ulti-
mate change both psychologically and perceptually. There, some
secretaries have become rich by receiving stock options as part
of their compensation. They were given these stock options
because these secretaries were willing to work for upstart com-
panies that had a lot of promise but little money. The dedica-
tion of all those involved to the success of the new business
redounded to the benefit of all. This sort of motivation, where
each employee views her contribution as important to the suc-
cess of the firm, creates an enthusiastic and active firm which
has a higher chance of success. As a result, the pie becomes
larger and everyone benefits. Furthermore, in lean times, eco-
nomic losses are not compounded with chaos and unrest.
The Information Age allows us finally to reconcile our eco-
nomic interests with our moral principles. On the legal plain,
that means redrafting the statutes so as to reconceptualize the
corporation as a community of economic interests that sets its
own goals democratically, while cognizant of being part of and
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imbedded in a society with values. It also means drafting provi-
sions that protect and encourage managers of a corporation who
recognize these facts and act upon them. "Citizens" of a corpo-
ration must be redefined to improve the process of consulting
and decision-making and realign corporate democracy. Finally,
managerial and other hierarchies must be flattened and laws
drafted, including securities laws, that will open the door to full
and free communication among all these "citizens" without
burdening them with high costs. The presence of the Internet
will assist in this goal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Technological innovations create new media that modify hu-
man experience in significant ways. These media do not, howev-
er, impose predetermined modes of relating on humanity. They
only have a propensity to facilitate certain modes as opposed to
others. Other factors, such as economy and ideology, play an
important part as well. Innovative energy appears to rest with
organizations that have two main features, open communication
and "loose" controls or open structures. Contrary to common
belief, such features could exist in a large as well as a small
firm, although the larger structure has a propensity for in-
creased bureaucratic control and hierarchy.
In the new age of Information, innovations become obsolete
within a short period of time. This places an immense amount
of pressure on firms for continued innovation to preserve their
competitive advantage. Small firms have proven to be more
nimble in this area than larger firms. Small firms, however, are
often unable to preserve their advantage in mature markets or
enter capital-intensive areas of innovation. Consequently, an
alliance among companies of various sizes and structures may
be optimal to preserve the whole economy's competitive edge in
an increasingly competitive global market.
Finally, the Information Age, with its propensities toward
communication, flattening of hierarchies, cooperation and de-
mocracy, will necessitate a new way of perceiving the firm and
its constituencies. This perception will evolve as more data
accumulates with respect to the obsolescence of a corporate
governance system dedicated to the interest of the sharehold-
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ers/shareowners alone, the critical role of human capital in the
new age, the cost of continued disenfranchisement of employees
from corporate governance and the inefficiencies related to
solving these matters by using incremental circuitous methods
instead of overhauling the Industrial Age legal system. The
required ideological/conceptual shift may be delayed by path
dependencies in United States corporate history. Such delays
will give other countries a chance to leapfrog to the forefront of
technological leadership.

